RUAM-IoD: A Robust User Authentication Mechanism for the Internet of Drones

Abstract

The revolutionary advancement in the capabilities of hardware tools, software packages, and communication techniques gave rise to the Internet of Things-supported drone networks (IoD), thereby enabling smooth communication among devices and applications, and impacting drastically the various aspects of human lives. However, with the increasing sophistication in the infrastructure of IoD, new security threats arise that require novel algorithms and schemes as solutions. To this end, several schemes have recently been proposed. However, some schemes cannot perfectly address the novel security aspects associated with IoD environments, while others cannot provide computational or communication efficiency. Motivated by these research gaps in the existing literature, we leverage elliptic curve cryptography along with symmetric encryption and hash function, and propose a novel and robust user authentication mechanism for the IoD, called RUAM-IoD. We validate the security of the established SK formally through the random oracle model. Similarly, we provide informal security analysis to demonstrate the security capabilities of RUAM-IoD against different pernicious security attacks. Likewise, we establish a comparison of the RUAM-IoD with several state-of-the-art authentication schemes to show that RUAM-IoD acquires less storage, communication, and computational cost.

Provably Secure Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement Scheme Using PUF in Internet of Drones Deployments

“…Therefore, they only utilized hash functions and exclusive-OR operators. In the same year, Tanveer et al [ 18 ] proposed an authentication mechanism for IoD environments. They used an AES-CBC-256 cipher and ECC to ensure the anonymity of users.…”

“…They used an AES-CBC-256 cipher and ECC to ensure the anonymity of users. Although the above schemes [ 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 17 , 18 ] provide useful services such as healthcare, rescue, and traffic surveillance, they can suffer from physical attacks because each drone cannot protect security parameters from power analysis attacks.…”

“…We summarize the cryptographic techniques and the advantages and limitations of the existing related schemes [ 4 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 ] in Table 1 . Although previous authentication schemes can provide convenient services to users, they still have high computational and communication overhead and security drawback problems.…”

“…We demonstrate the security features of the proposed scheme with a related sch- eme [ 4 , 14 , 18 , 21 , 24 ] in terms of “security functionalities”, “communication costs”, and “computation costs”.…”

“…In order to provide visualized information, we offer comprehensive security properties of the proposed scheme and related schemes [ 4 , 14 , 17 , 18 , 21 , 24 ] in a table. As shown in Table 4 , we consider various security functionalities and attacks, including “stolen smart card/mobile device”, “offline password guessing ”, “impersonation”, “replay”, “privileged-insider”, “physical and cloning”, “ESL”, “verification table leakage”, “user anonymity”, “perfect forward secrecy”, “mutual authentication”, “DoS”, “untraceability”, “device/drone capture”, and “correctness”.…”