Sanctions-Busting, Material Power, and Institutional Support for Economic Sanctions

Abstract

International institutions play a key role in sanctions success. However, little is known about when senders mobilize institutional sanctions and how they induce international institutions to support their sanctioning efforts. Senders may need institutional support when they expect third-party states to engage in sanctions-busting. I suggest that senders anticipate sanctions-busting when they face third-party rivals which also have an alliance tie with targets. The presence of such potential sanctions busters may lead senders to seek institutional support. Also, senders should possess substantial material power to induce member states of international institutions to approve the sanctioning efforts. I assess the theoretical claim of this research by analyzing 1,038 sanctions episodes over the period 1951–2005. The findings support my argument that senders pursue institutional support when they face potential sanctions busters, and the success of their efforts partly depend on their material power.

The Effects of Trade Related Sanctions on Russia on Kazakhstan’s International Trade in Goods

“…Some studies suggest that sanctions can create trade opportunities for third countries as they may step in to fill the void left by the sanctioning countries (Early, 2009). Recent studies on sanctions have focused on the effects of sanctions busting (Jeong, 2023;Peterson, 2021;Preble, 2023). For sanctions to achieve political objectives, the sender countries should involve multilateral institutions and signal third countries about the consequences of sanctions busting (Jeong, 2023).…”

“…Recent studies on sanctions have focused on the effects of sanctions busting (Jeong, 2023;Peterson, 2021;Preble, 2023). For sanctions to achieve political objectives, the sender countries should involve multilateral institutions and signal third countries about the consequences of sanctions busting (Jeong, 2023).…”

On the Concept of Equilibrium in Sanctions and Countersanctions in a Differential Game

“…The sanctions are mostly partial and restrict weapons and military equipment supplies to these countries. In some cases, foreign assets are frozen [4,5].…”