Scientific realism and the semantic incommensurability thesis

Sankey, Howard

doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.03.007

Cited by 23 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…15 Los críticos apuntan que aquellas teorías que poseen una referencia común no se pueden decir recíprocamente inconmensurables (Cf. SCHEFFLER, 1967;PUTNAM, 1965;1975, 117-131;KITCHER, 1978;PARSONS 1975;DEVITT 1979;SANKEY 1994). Feyerabend no sostuvo dos posturas contrarias -como parece dar a entender Craig Dilworth (2007, 78-79)-sino que, más bien, alcanza en 1975 una formulación más precisa del problema.…”

Section: La Inconmensurabilidad Y El Realismo Científicounclassified

“…Feyerabend, 1954Feyerabend, /19551958/1981a1958a, 75-104;1958c, 343;/1981a19611964/19811966, 5-6;1968, p. 321;/1981/19811981f, 218, 224-225;1993/2008 y el realismo ingenuo (Feyerabend 1958a, 78-81;1991b, 118;199119941999, 91-92). Mientras que éste último considera lo real como algo dado, él postula que lo real se comprende en función de lo teórico.…”

Section: La Inconmensurabilidad Y El Realismo Científicounclassified

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La doctrina de la inconmensurabilidad en Paul Feyerabend: una objeción contra una particular concepción de racionalidad científica

Gargiulo

2017

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RESUMEN. La inconmensurabilidad ha ocasionado innumerables controversias y debates. En estos parece ser unánime la interpretación de tal doctrina como una objeción contra la objetividad, el realismo y el progreso científico. Ahora bien, este marco hermenéutico es estrecho para poder comprender la intencionalidad de Paul Feyerabend al formular su doctrina de la inconmensurabilidad. Pues éste no pretendió cuestionar nunca a dichas nociones en cuanto tales sino únicamente mostrar cuán vano resulta ser el intento del neo-positivismo y del racionalismo popperiano por definirlas. En un sentido positivo sostenemos que la inconmensurabilidad en Paul Feyerabend impide o evita retomar, a la hora de definir aquellas nociones, las dialécticas propias del positivismo lógico o del racionalismo crítico. Nuestra intención en este trabajo es exponer su tesis de la inconmensurabilidad como un cuestionamiento a un modo particular de concebir la racionalidad científica y a sus consecuentes nociones de objetividad, progreso y realismo científico.PALABRAS CLAVE: Feyerabend, inconmensurabilidad, criterio de demarcación, relación ciencia-metafísica, Kuhn. The Doctrine of Incommensurability in Paul Feyerabend. An Objection Against a Particular Conception of Scientific RationalityABSTRACT. Incommensurability has caused many controversies and debates. In these debates seems to be unanimous the interpretation of that doctrine as an objection to objectivity, realism and scientific progress. Now this is a narrow hermeneutical framework for understanding the intention of Paul Feyerabend when formulating his doctrine of incommensurability. Because he was never intended to challenge such notions in themselves but only to show how vain turns out to be the neo-positivism and Popperian rationalism´s attempt to define them. In a positive sense we argue that incommensurability, according to Paul Feyerabend, prevents or impedes when we comes to define those notions return to dialectical of logical positivism or critical rationalism. Our intention in this paper is to present his thesis of incommensurability as a challenge to a particular way of conceiving scientific rationality and its consequent notions of objectivity, progress and scientific realism.KEY WORDS: Feyerabend, incommensurability demarcation criterion, relationship between science and metaphysics, Kuhn.

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Section: La Inconmensurabilidad Y El Realismo Científicounclassified

La doctrina de la inconmensurabilidad en Paul Feyerabend: una objeción contra una particular concepción de racionalidad científica

Gargiulo

2017

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“…Rather than resulting in an increase in the understanding of SYPHILIS-1, the discovery of T. pallidum resulted in “syphilis” being displaced from SYPHILIS-1 and attached instead onto SYPHILIS-2. Similarly, Sankey (2009 , p.198) notes that if a later concept does not refer to the same phenomenon to which an earlier concept had referred, then the conceptual change does not constitute an increase in knowledge about the phenomenon referred to by the earlier concept.…”

Section: Descriptive and Causal Conceptions Of Diagnostic Termsmentioning

confidence: 99%

To what do psychiatric diagnoses refer? A two-dimensional semantic analysis of diagnostic terms

Maung

2016

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in

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In somatic medicine, diagnostic terms often refer to the disease processes that are the causes of patients' symptoms. The language used in some clinical textbooks and health information resources suggests that this is also sometimes assumed to be the case with diagnoses in psychiatry. However, this seems to be in tension with the ways in which psychiatric diagnoses are defined in diagnostic manuals, according to which they refer solely to clusters of symptoms. This paper explores how theories of reference in the philosophy of language can help to resolve this tension. After the evaluation of descriptive and causal theories of reference, I put forward a conceptual framework based on two-dimensional semantics that allows the causal analysis of diagnostic terms in psychiatry, while taking seriously their descriptive definitions in diagnostic manuals. While the framework is presented as a solution to a problem regarding the semantics of psychiatric diagnoses, it can also accommodate the analysis of diagnostic terms in other medical disciplines.

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“…The incommensurability thesis questions the rationality, which supposedly guides the process of choosing between divergent scientific theories, and also questions the supposed progressive feature when it comes to succession between scientific theories 39 . Furthermore, scientific results, being predictable only when properly inserted in an experimental arrangement, provide to knowledge a feature, which is fundamentally contextual and specific to certain situations 40 .…”

Section: Feyerabendian Propositionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For these situations, the discourse on truth takes on an implicit tone of temporariness, of provisionality. Seen this way, the incommensurability not only compromises the assumption that the process of choosing among theories takes place rationally, but also compromises the assumption that changes in scientific theories occur in a progressive way 26 .…”

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confidence: 99%

What can the philosophy of science contribute to the ethics of science and technology?

Cruz¹,

Cornelli

2016

Rev. Bioét.

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Born to enable its creators to fulfill their needs, scientific technique has always played a significant role in human civilization. This is the context in which we glimpse the advent of modern technoscience, which has significantly contributed to the increment of human control over nature. This study aims to analyze, under the focus of bioethics, reflections on the philosophy of science as they relate to the neutrality of science and converge with epistemic rationality, as well as to relate those reflections to the process of making decisions in the administration of technoscience. The study has raised doubts about the capacity of technoscientific knowledge to legitimize and justify the decisions within the ambit of the national science and technology systems, thus signaling the need for promoting a link between technoscientific self-regulation and bioethic hetero-regulation. Keywords: Bioethics. Knowledge. Science. Science, technology and society.Resumo O que pode a filosofia da ciência contribuir para a ética da ciência e tecnologia? Nascida para permitir que seus criadores possam atender suas próprias necessidades, a técnica científica sempre desempenhou papel significativo na civilização humana. Este é o contexto em que podemos vislumbrar o advento da tecnociência moderna, que tem contribuído significativamente para o incremento do controle humano sobre a natureza. Este estudo tem por objetivo analisar, sob o enfoque da bioética, reflexões sobre como a filosofia da ciência entende a neutralidade da ciência e sua convergência com a racionalidade epistêmica, bem como relacionar essas reflexões ao processo de tomada de decisões na administração da tecnociência. O estudo levantou dúvidas sobre a capacidade do conhecimento tecnocientífico para legitimar e justificar as decisões no âmbito dos sistemas de ciência e tecnologia nacionais, sinalizando assim a necessidade de promover ligação entre a auto-regulação tecnocientífico e hetero-regulação bioética. Palavras-chave: Bioética. Conhecimento. Ciência. Ciência, tecnologia e sociedade.Resumen ¿En qué puede contribuir la filosofía de la ciencia a la ética de la ciencia y la tecnología? Nacida para permitir a sus creadores satisfacer sus necesidades, la técnica científica siempre ha desempeñado un papel importante en la civilización humana. Este es el contexto en el que se vislumbra el advenimiento de la tecnociencia moderna, la cual ha contribuido significativamente al incremento del control humano sobre la naturaleza. Este estudio tiene como objetivo analizar, bajo el enfoque de la bioética, reflexiones acerca de cómo la filosofía de la ciencia entiende a la neutralidad de la ciencia y a su convergencia con la racionalidad epistémica, así como relacionar estas reflexiones con el proceso de toma de decisiones en la administración de la tecnociencia. El estudio ha puesto en duda la capacidad del conocimiento tecnocientífico para legitimar y justificar las decisiones en el ámbito de los sistemas nacionales de ciencia y tecnología, señalando así la necesidad de...

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Scientific realism and the semantic incommensurability thesis

Cited by 23 publications

References 6 publications

La doctrina de la inconmensurabilidad en Paul Feyerabend: una objeción contra una particular concepción de racionalidad científica

La doctrina de la inconmensurabilidad en Paul Feyerabend: una objeción contra una particular concepción de racionalidad científica

To what do psychiatric diagnoses refer? A two-dimensional semantic analysis of diagnostic terms

What can the philosophy of science contribute to the ethics of science and technology?

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