Searle’s Wall

Blackmon, James

doi:10.1007/s10670-012-9405-4

Cited by 5 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Blackmon (2013) also emphasizes the relativity of implementation. For connections between the applicability of mathematics and computational implementation see(Matthews and Dresner 2017) and(Schweizer 2019a).20 At least, up to any indeterminacy in the properties cited by the specific scheme.…”

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confidence: 99%

The determinacy of computation

Curtis-Trudel

2022

Synthese

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A skeptical worry known as 'the indeterminacy of computation' animates much recent philosophical reflection on the computational identity of physical systems.On the one hand, computational explanation seems to require that physical computing systems fall under a single, unique computational description at a time. On the other, if a physical system falls under any computational description, it seems to fall under many simultaneously. Absent some principled reason to take just one of these descriptions in particular as relevant for computational explanation, widespread failure of computational explanation would appear to follow. This paper advances a new solution to the indeterminacy of computation. Very roughly, I argue that the computational identity of a physical system is determinate relative to a contextually specified way of regarding that system computationally ---known as a labelling scheme. When a system simultaneously implements multiple computations, it does so relative to different labelling schemes. But relative to a fixed labelling scheme, a physical system has a unique computational identity. I argue that this relativistic conception of computational identity vindicates computational explanation and comports well with computational practice.

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confidence: 99%

The determinacy of computation

Curtis-Trudel

2022

Synthese

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“…Mundy (1987) and others have argued that this second-order version is in fact much more intuitive than the first-order version. 5 It is for this reason that Blackmon's (2013) argument against computational skepticism does not seem to meet Putnam's challenge. Blackmon points out that the same object may have different velocities with respect to different frames of reference, but this falls short of what Putnam purports to show, i.e.…”

Section: Application To Computational Implementationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Not surprisingly, the skeptical challenges raised by Putnam and Searle have been, and continue to be, the focus of considerable philosophical attention, with numerous philosophers undertaking to defend computationalism from these challenges, often in the context of a more general theory as to the nature and bounds of computation (Blackmon , Chalmers , Chalmers , Copeland , Chrisley , Godfrey‐Smith , Scheutz , Piccinini , Egan ). The proposed theories vary widely, and there seems to be little consensus as to what is wrong with Putnam's and Searle's skeptical arguments, even if critics all agree that something is indeed wrong with them.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Measurement and Computational Skepticism

Matthews

Dresner

2016

Nous

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Putnam and Searle famously argue against computational theories of mind on the skeptical ground that there is no fact of the matter as to what mathematical function a physical system is computing: both conclude (albeit for somewhat different reasons) that virtually any physical object computes every computable function, implements every program or automaton. There has been considerable discussion of Putnam's and Searle's arguments, though as yet there is little consensus as to what, if anything, is wrong with these arguments. In the present paper we show that an analogous line of reasoning can be raised against the numerical measurement (i.e., numerical representation) of physical magnitudes, and we argue that this result is a reductio ad absurdum of the challenge to computational skepticism. We then use this reductio to get clearer about both (i) what's wrong with Putnam's and Searle's arguments against computationalism, and (ii) what can be learned about both computational implementation and numerical measurement from the shortcomings of both sorts of skeptical argument.

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“…Serlov argument kineske sobe, kojim je želeo da pokaže da kompjutacionizam ne može da objasni razumevanje semantičkog sadržaja kod ljudi i da Tjuringov test ne može da razluči između simulacije procesa mišljenja i razumevanja i pravog razumevanja, jeste verovatno jedan od najpoznatijih argumenata iz filozofske literature. Ipak, Serlov napad na kompjutacionizam dolazi i u jednoj drugačijoj formi i ima još radikalnije posledice i možemo ga nazvati argumentom "Serlovog zida" (Blackmon 2013). Ovaj atak na ideju da je kompjutaciona struktura suštinska za kognitivne procese i ideju "jake veštačke inteligencije" prema kojoj je "um mozgu, ono što je program računarskom hardveru" (Searle 1984: 28) osnovan je na standardnim pojmovima kompjutacije i implementacije, kako to sam Serl kaže, i na pripisivanju kompjutacionizmu tvrdnje da je mišljenje moguće izjednačiti sa programom računara.…”

Section: Dinamicizam I Kompjutacionizam Su Trivijalno Kompatibilniunclassified

“…Prema Serlu određena sintaksa je uvek stvar interpretacije, to jest, pripisivanje određenih formalnih, sintaktičkih svojstava fizičkom sistemu je uvek arbirtarno. Odgovori na Serlov izazov su brojni i neki od njih tvrde da izomorfizam o kojem Serl govori nije dovoljan za tvrdnju da postoji implementacija odgovarajućeg programa (Haugeland 2002), neki da nema takvog formalnog izomorfizma koji bi ugrozio kompjutacionizam (Chalmers 1996), dok neki tvrde da je Serlov zaključak o mogućnosti implementacije bilo kog programa prejak (Blackmon 2013). Mi se ovim protivargumentima nećemo baviti i smatraćemo da je Serlov argument dobar pod pretpostavkama koje usvaja, to jest, da pretpostavke o fizičkoj strukturi moraju da se zasnuju nezavisno od kompjutacionih formalizama.…”

Section: Dinamicizam I Kompjutacionizam Su Trivijalno Kompatibilniunclassified

Is cognition computational or dynamical?

Milojević

2015

Theoria

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Pojava dinamičkog pristupa u kognitivnoj nauci pokrenula je filozofsku debatu o prirodi kognicije, odnosno, o tome da li je priroda kognitivnih procesa dinamička ili kompjutaciona. U ovom tekstu bavimo se pitanjem odnosa kompjutacionizma i dinamicizma i njihovim mogućim ontološkim implikacijama. Preciznije, bavimo se već ponuđenim odgovorima na ovo pitanje i procenjujemo ih u skladu sa posebnim shvatanjima naučnih modela u kognitivnoj nauci. KLJUČNE REČI: kompjutacionizam, dinamicizam, naučni modeli, kognitivna nauka 1 Ovaj rad je nastao u okviru projekta "Dinamički sistemi u prirodi i društvu: filozofski i empirijski aspekti", evidencioni broj 179041 koji finansira Ministarstvo prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije.

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Searle’s Wall

Cited by 5 publications

References 10 publications

The determinacy of computation

The determinacy of computation

Measurement and Computational Skepticism

Is cognition computational or dynamical?

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