SecGPSR: A secure GPSR protocol for FANET against Sybil and Gray Hole Attacks

Abstract

In recent years, drones have become increasingly prevalent in a wide range of applications, performing complex and critical tasks. To accomplish these tasks, drones cooperate by forming a Fly Ad-hoc Network (FANET) using specific routing protocols for communication. However, most of the routing protocols used in this type of network lack appropriate built-in security mechanisms, which creates numerous security challenges and concerns. To reduce the resulting security vulnerabilities and mitigate the impact of potential attacks, it is crucial to address these challenges before any deployment of FANETs. In this paper, we address two of the most harmful routing attacks - Sybil and Gray Hole and propose mitigating techniques to alleviate these attacks on FANET routing protocols. The proposed solution is secGPSR a secure version of the Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing Protocol (GPSR). We validate the robustness of secGPSR through simulation using Omnet++ and present the results which show its effectiveness against Sybil and Gray Hole attacks.