Security and Privacy Experiences and Practices of Survivors of Intimate Partner Abuse

An Evidence Synthesis of Covert Online Strategies Regarding Intimate Partner Violence

“…Conversely, three studies reported that survivors restricted their presence online , and access/use of technology ( Dimond et al, 2011 ; Freed et al, 2017 ; Matthews et al, 2017 ). Some survivors avoided going online, for example, using a paper calendar, fearing that their abuser had greater technical prowess and could uncover their activities ( Freed et al, 2017 ).…”

“…Some survivors avoided going online, for example, using a paper calendar, fearing that their abuser had greater technical prowess and could uncover their activities ( Freed et al, 2017 ). Constraints were also placed on survivors’ online activities through perpetrators’ physical control of devices and monitoring behaviors ( Dimond et al, 2011 ; Matthews et al, 2017 ).…”

“…Survivors could also be proactive in using blocking mechanisms: for example, installing caller ID or call blocking to prevent the perpetrator contacting them, changing or installing new locks or security systems ( Truman, 2011 ), or installing software that warns when someone is trying to hack into their accounts ( Dimond et al, 2011 ; Freed et al, 2017 ; Matthews et al, 2017 ; Truman, 2011 ). However, attempts to evade contact with their perpetrator were made more challenging by difficulties in blocking unwanted calls and text messages, including financial costs and service provision by network carrier ( Dimond et al, 2011 ).…”

“…Five studies reported the use of strengthened privacy settings as a way of achieving granular control over survivors’ online presence: for example, using Facebook privacy settings to restrict the majority of their profile to friends only, as well as to block some individuals and to limit profile viewing to others ( Chaulk & Jones, 2011 ). Some types of privacy and security options that were particularly useful to survivors were those that enabled them to safely and privately use alternate devices (e.g., using private browsing on someone else’s device), effectively control their digital traces (e.g., delete content), and maintain ambiguity and/or plausible deniability in their use of technology ( Finn & Atkinson, 2009 ; Freed et al, 2017 ; Matthews et al, 2017 ; Tarzia et al, 2017 ).…”

Datta Burton, S; Tanczer, LM; Vasudevan, S; Hailes, S; Carr, M; (2021) The UK Code of Practice for Consumer IoT Cybersecurity: where we are and what next

“…For example, IBM recently released five "coercive control resistant" design principles, which are intended to prevent developments from being used for domestic abuse (Nuttall et al, 2020). Google's Security & Privacy Research & Design Group has produced various outputs on the issue of tech abuse (Matthews et al, 2017a(Matthews et al, , 2017bSambasivan & et al, 2019aSambasivan & et al, , 2019bSambasivan & et al, , 2019c and, prompted by research findings, taken action against some spyware apps that were available on its app store (Chatterjee et al, 2018). Kaspersky, F-Secure and other anti-virus and cybersecurity providers have recently established a dedicated "Coalition against Stalkerware".…”