Self-confidence and strategic behavior

Charness, Gary; Rustichini, Aldo; Ven, Jeroen van de

doi:10.1007/s10683-017-9526-3

Cited by 72 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…They argue that the data are consistent with overconfidence as a social bias. Charness et al (2013) find that experimental participants use public statements about their own ability strategically to deter others from engaging in competition with them. Ewers and Zimmermann (2015) show that the desire to impress an audience causes experimental subjects to state higher confidence.…”

Section: Literature and Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…Thoma (2015) demonstrates that when others can observe their degree of overconfidence about task performance, men strategically deflate confidence in order to appear more likable. Note that Burks et al (2013) measure private beliefs, but don't vary the strategic context, whereas Charness et al (2013), Ewers and Zimmermann (2015) and Thoma (2015) vary the context of the interaction, but don't measure private beliefs. 1 Our study does both.…”

Section: Literature and Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1 Charness et al (2013) measure private beliefs, but only in one of their conditions. 2 Anderson et al (2012) write on page 731: "[W]e cannot know with certainty whether overconfident individuals truly believed that they were highly competent, or whether they were merely reporting what they wished to believe.…”

Section: Literature and Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Deception and Self-Deception

Schwardmann

Weele

2016

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe experimentally investigate the determinants of overconfidence and test the hypothesis, advanced by Robert Trivers, that overconfidence serves to more effectively persuade or deceive others. After performing a cognitively challenging task, half of our subjects are informed about the possibility of earning money by convincing others of their high relative performance in a structured face-to-face interaction. Privately elicited beliefs show that informed participants are 50% more overconfident than those in a control condition, and are less responsive to objective feedback on their performance. Using random variation in confidence generated by our feedback mechanism, we find that increased confidence indeed causes higher evaluations in the ensuing interactions, unless the evaluators have been explicitly instructed to watch out for lies. These results support the idea that confidence is a strategic variable in human interaction. JEL-codes: C91, D03, D83.

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Section: Literature and Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 96%

Section: Literature and Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Deception and Self-Deception

Schwardmann

Weele

2016

SSRN Journal

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“…5 Appendix B includes a screenshot of the decision screen for each task. 6 Raven test scores are associated with the degree of sophistication in the beauty contest [Gill and Prowse, 2015], with the performance in Bayesian updating [Charness et al, 2011], and with more accurate beliefs [Burks et al, 2009].…”

Section: Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (Bret)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Protecting Unsophisticated Applicants in School Choice through Information Disclosure

Basteck

Mantovani

2016

SSRN Journal

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Unsophisticated applicants can be at a disadvantage under manipulable and hence strategically demanding school choice mechanisms. Disclosing information on applications in previous admission periods makes it easier to asses the chances of being admitted at a particular school, and hence may level the playing field between applicants who differ in their cognitive ability. We test this conjecture experimentally for the widely used Boston mechanism. Results show that, absent this information, there exist a substantial gap between subjects of higher and lower cognitive ability, resulting in significant differences in payoffs, and ability segregation across schools. The treatment is effective in improving applicants' strategic performance. However, because both lower and higher ability subjects improve when they have information about past demands, the gap between the two groups shrinks only marginally, and the instrument fails at levelling the playing field.

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“…Signals about one's ability can also be used strategically to influence others' decisions in competitive settings (Charness et al 2018).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self Confidence Spillovers and Motivated Beliefs

2018

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Abstract:Is success in a task used strategically by individuals to motivate their beliefs prior to taking action in a subsequent, unrelated, task? Also, is the distortion of beliefs reinforced for individuals who have lower status in society? Conducting an artefactual field experiment in India, we show that success when competing in a task increases the performers' self-confidence and competitiveness in the subsequent task. We also find that such spillovers affect the self-confidence of low-status individuals more than that of high-status individuals. Receiving good news under Affirmative Action, however, boosts confidence across tasks regardless of the caste status. Keywords:Motivated beliefs, spillovers, self-confidence, competitiveness, Affirmative Action, experiment JEL codes:C91, J15, M52 Self Confidence Spillovers and Motivated BeliefsRitwik Banerjee a , Nabanita Datta Gupta b , Marie Claire Villeval c Abstract: Is success in a task used strategically by individuals to motivate their beliefs prior to taking action in a subsequent, unrelated, task? Also, is the distortion of beliefs reinforced for individuals who have lower status in society? Conducting an artefactual field experiment in India, we show that success when competing in a task increases the performers' selfconfidence and competitiveness in the subsequent task. We also find that such spillovers affect the self-confidence of low-status individuals more than that of high-status individuals. Receiving good news under Affirmative Action, however, boosts confidence across tasks regardless of the caste status.JEL codes: C91, J15, M52

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Self-confidence and strategic behavior

Cited by 72 publications

References 43 publications

Deception and Self-Deception

Deception and Self-Deception

Protecting Unsophisticated Applicants in School Choice through Information Disclosure

Self Confidence Spillovers and Motivated Beliefs

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