Selfish Grids: Game-Theoretic Modeling and NAS/PSA Benchmark Evaluation

Kwok, Yue Kuen; Hwang, Kai; Song, Shanshan

doi:10.1109/tpds.2007.1013

Cited by 58 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…Coping with peer abuses and selfishness: Various malicious behavior models should be investigated to secure P2P system applications. New mechanisms are needed to deal with intrusions, free riders, black mouths, collusions, and selfishness of peers [12], [14], [37].…”

Section: Conclusion and Further Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

PowerTrust: A Robust and Scalable Reputation System for Trusted Peer-to-Peer Computing

Rui

Hwang

2007

IEEE Trans. Parallel Distrib. Syst.

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636

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reputation systems are essential to evaluate the trustworthiness of participating peers and to combat the selfish, dishonest, and malicious peer behaviors. The system collects locally-generated peer feedbacks and aggregates them to yield the global reputation scores. Surprisingly, most previous work ignored the distribution of peer feedbacks.We use a trust overlay network (TON) to model the trust relationships among peers. After examining the eBay transaction trace of over 10,000 users, we discovered a power-law distribution in user feedbacks. Our mathematical analysis justifies that power-law distribution is applicable to any dynamically growing P2P systems, either structured or unstructured.We develop a robust and scalable P2P reputation system, PowerTrust, to leverage the power-law feedback characteristics. The PowerTrust system dynamically selects small number of power nodes that are most reputable using a distributed ranking mechanism. By using a lookahead random walk strategy and leveraging the power nodes, the PowerTrust significantly improves in global reputation accuracy and aggregation speed. PowerTrust is adaptable to dynamics in peer joining and leaving and robust to disturbance by malicious peers. Through P2P network simulation experiments, we find significant performance gains in using PowerTrust.This power-law guided reputation system design proves to achieve high query success rate in P2P file-sharing applications. The system also reduces the total job makespan and failure rate in large-scale, parameter-sweeping P2P Grid applications.

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Section: Conclusion and Further Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

PowerTrust: A Robust and Scalable Reputation System for Trusted Peer-to-Peer Computing

Rui

Hwang

2007

IEEE Trans. Parallel Distrib. Syst.

Self Cite

636

379

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“…Song et al (2005; considered risky and insecure conditions in online scheduling in grids caused by software vulnerability and distrusted resources. They applied a game-theoretical model introduced by Kwok et al (2007) for modeling resource owners selfish behavior in the hierarchical grid structure. A Space Time Genetic Algorithm (STGA) was implemented as the main mechanism of three risk-resilient meta-heuristics, named as risky, preemptive and replicated STG algorithms.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Kwok et al (2007) presented a hierarchical grid model with three main levels: the global, the inter-site and the intra-site level. At the intra-site level, there is a federation of autonomous resources.…”

Section: Preliminariesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Modern approaches to modeling user requirements on resource and task allocation in hierarchical computational grids

Kołodziej¹,

Xhafa²

2011

International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science

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Tasks scheduling and resource allocation are among crucial issues in any large scale distributed system, including Computational Grids (CGs). These issues are commonly investigated using traditional computational models and resolution methods that yield near-optimal scheduling strategies. One drawback of such approaches is that they cannot effectively tackle the complex nature of CGs. On the one hand, such systems account for many administrative domains with their own access policies, user privileges, etc. On the other, CGs have hierarchical nature and therefore any computational model should be able to effectively express the hierarchical architecture in the optimization model. Recently, researchers have been investigating the use of game theory for modeling user requirements regarding task and resource allocation in grid scheduling problems. In this paper we present two general non-cooperative game approaches, namely, the symmetric non-zero sum game and the asymmetric Stackelberg game for modeling grid user behavior defined as user requirements. In our game-theoretic approaches we are able to cast new requirements arising in allocation problems, such as asymmetric users relations, security and reliability restrictions in CGs. For solving the games, we designed and implemented GA-based hybrid schedulers for approximating the equilibrium points for both games. The proposed hybrid resolution methods are experimentally evaluated through the grid simulator under heterogeneity, and large-scale and dynamics conditions. The relative performance of the schedulers is measured in terms of the makespan and flowtime metrics. The experimental analysis showed high efficiency of meta-heuristics in solving the game-based models, especially in the case of an additional cost of secure task scheduling to be paid by the users.

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“…For instance, Kwok et al [15] presented a hierarchical Grid computing model by taking machine selfishness into consideration and proposed a non-cooperative game theory based intrasite job execution mechanism. They found that the optimal selfish strategy significantly outperforms the Nash selfish strategy.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mechanism Design for Stochastic Virtual Resource Allocation in Non-cooperative Cloud Systems

Kong

Guo

2011

2011 IEEE 4th International Conference on Cloud Computing

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Abstract-Currently, virtualization technology has been widely adopted by cloud service providers to provide flexible and costeffective resource sharing among users. On cloud platforms, computing resources are allocated on-demand dynamically and the application hosted on a virtual machine(VM) usually has the illusion of complete control of resources. Thus, a selfish VM may strategically compete for resource with other VMs to maximize its own benefit while at the cost of overall system performance. This problem poses new challenges to cloud providers, who must thwart non-cooperative behavior as well as allocating resource among selfish VMs efficiently. In this paper, we propose to utilize mechanism design to allocate resource among selfish VMs in a non-cooperative cloud environment. Because the accurate relationship between VM's valuation function and allocated resource may not be available in practice and the valuation function parameters may not noisefree, we also propose to apply stochastic approximation methods to get stochastic solution for allocation and payment outcomes. We show through theoretical analysis and simulations that the proposed stochastic mechanism is efficient and incentive compatible. That is, the incorporation of mechanism design for virtualized resource allocation is able to enforce cooperation and achieve efficient resource utilization among selfish VMs in non-cooperative cloud systems.

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Selfish Grids: Game-Theoretic Modeling and NAS/PSA Benchmark Evaluation

Cited by 58 publications

References 45 publications

PowerTrust: A Robust and Scalable Reputation System for Trusted Peer-to-Peer Computing

PowerTrust: A Robust and Scalable Reputation System for Trusted Peer-to-Peer Computing

Modern approaches to modeling user requirements on resource and task allocation in hierarchical computational grids

Mechanism Design for Stochastic Virtual Resource Allocation in Non-cooperative Cloud Systems

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