Sensitivity, Causality, and Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law

Abstract

Recent attempts to resolve the Paradox of the Gatecrasher rest on a now familiar distinction between individual and bare statistical evidence. This paper investigates two such approaches, the causal approach to individual evidence and a recently influential (and award-winning) modal account that explicates individual evidence in terms of Nozick's notion of sensitivity. This paper offers counterexamples to both approaches, explicates a problem concerning necessary truths for the sensitivity account, and argues that either view is implausibly committed to the impossibility of no-fault wrongful convictions. The paper finally concludes that the distinction between individual and bare statistical evidence cannot be maintained in terms of causation or sensitivity. We have to look elsewhere for a solution of the Paradox of the Gatecrasher.

Naked statistical evidence and incentives for lawful conduct

“…In this scenario, a verdict from a previous rodeo or prison riot where the defendant was convicted on naked statistical evidence will give Napoleon some incentive to act lawfully, since he knows that there will be naked statistical evidence if he acts unlawfully, but there will be no such evidence to use against him if he acts lawfully. A hypothetical scenario along these lines has been introduced to the debate on naked statistical evidence by Michael Blome-Tillmann (2015: 106–107). I will refer to this rather unrealistic scenario as the Napoleon scenario .…”

“…The Gatecrasher Case , the Prison Riot Case and the Blue Bus Case started a discussion that has been going on for over forty years, and is still going strong. The problem of naked statistical evidence has been addressed by a parade of eminent scholars: Tribe (1971), Cohen (1977), Kaye (1979), Williams (1979), Eggleston (1980), Twining (1980), Nesson (1985), Fienberg (1986), Thomson (1986), Wright (1988), Dant (1988), Allen (1991), Wasserman (1991), Posner (1999), Colyvan et al (2001), Stein (2005), Schauer (2006), Redmayne (2008), Pundik (2008, 2011), Enoch et al (2012), Cheng (2013), Nunn (2015 ), Blome-Tilman (2015), Nance (2016), Smith (2017), Di Bello (2018), Gardiner (2018), Moss (2018) and Pardo (2019). A number of different ideas on the root of the problem have been proposed, and several new ideas have been presented in recent years.…”

Belief, credence, and faith

“…15.See Cohen (1977), Thomson (1986), Colyvan et al (2001), Enoch et al (2012), Blome-Tillmann (2015), and Idem (2017). …”

Recent work on the proof paradox

“…16 16 See Blome‐Tillmann (2015), Gardiner (2018), Smith (2018), and Pardo (2018) for criticisms of sensitivity views. …”