Sequencing Games: a Survey

Curiel, Imma; Hamers, Herbert; Klijn, Flip

doi:10.1007/0-306-47526-x_2

Cited by 36 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…The early work of Curiel et al (1989) studies the cost allocation problem in a cooperative game based on the perennial scheduling problem of Smith (1956). A survey of related research is given by Curiel et al (2004).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decentralized subcontractor scheduling with divisible jobs

Hezarkhani

Kubiak

2015

J Sched

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Subcontracting allows manufacturer agents to reduce completion times of their jobs and thus obtain savings. This paper addresses the coordination of decentralized scheduling systems with a single subcontractor and several agents having divisible jobs. Assuming complete information, we design parametric pricing schemes that strongly coordinate this decentralized system, i.e., the agents' choices of subcontracting intervals always result in efficient schedules. The subcontractor's revenue under the pricing schemes depends on a single parameter which can be chosen to make the revenue as close to the total savings as required. Also, we give a lower bound on the subcontractor's revenue for any coordinating pricing scheme. Allowing private information about processing times, we prove that the pivotal mechanism is coordinating, i.e., agents are better off by reporting their true processing times, and by participating in the subcontracting. We show that the subcontractor's maximum revenue with any coordinating mechanism under private information equals the lower bound of that with coordinating pricing schemes under complete information. Finally, we address the asymmetric case where agents obtain savings at different rates per unit reduction in completion times. We show that coordinating pricing schemes do not always exist in this case.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decentralized subcontractor scheduling with divisible jobs

Hezarkhani

Kubiak

2015

J Sched

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“…This means that it is always possible to find a coalitionally stable cost savings division. A more recent review of sequencing games can be found in Curiel, Hamers, and Klijn (2002).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Step out–Step in sequencing games

Musegaas

Borm

Quant

2015

European Journal of Operational Research

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In this paper a new class of relaxed sequencing games is introduced: the class of Step out -Step in sequencing games. In this relaxation any player within a coalition is allowed to step out from his position in the processing order and to step in at any position later in the processing order. Providing an upper bound on the values of the coalitions we show that every Step out -Step in sequencing game has a non-empty core. This upper bound is a sufficient condition for a sequencing game to have a non-empty core. Moreover, this paper provides a polynomial time algorithm to determine the coalitional values of Step out -Step in sequencing games.

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“…Finally, van Velzen and Hamers (2003) and Slikker (2003) consider relaxations in the notion of admissibility of reorderings in one machine sequencing situations and focus on balancedness. A recent review on sequencing games can be found in Curiel, Hamers and Klijn (2002).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Job scheduling, cooperation, and control

Calleja

Estévez-Fernández

Borm

et al. 2006

Operations Research Letters

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Abstract:This paper considers one machine job scheduling situations or sequencing problems, where clients can have more than a single job to be processed in order to get a final output. Moreover, a job can be of interest for different players. This means that one of the main assumptions in classic sequencing problems is dropped: the one to one correspondence between clients and jobs. It is shown that the corresponding cooperative games are balanced for specific types of cost criteria.

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Sequencing Games: a Survey

Cited by 36 publications

References 19 publications

Decentralized subcontractor scheduling with divisible jobs

Decentralized subcontractor scheduling with divisible jobs

Step out–Step in sequencing games

Job scheduling, cooperation, and control

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