Sequential bargaining based incentive mechanism for collaborative Internet access

Uludağ, Kübra; Tasci, Sinan Emre; Korçak, Ömer

doi:10.1016/j.jnca.2020.102758

Cited by 1 publication

(2 citation statements)

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“…Strategic decisions of the clients determine the social welfare of the overall UPN system. Due to the nature of the network, it is desirable to adopt a distributed decision making mechanism for both autonomous and operator-assisted UPNs [23]. Therefore, game theory is a powerful tool to model strategies and analyze the outcome of such UPN systems.…”

Section: A Background and Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, most of these studies define the utility as the amount of data transferred, and they do not take the service quality into consideration. In a recent study, Uludag et al [23] have designed a UPN mechanism where the utility is defined as a function of data rate which is a metric for service quality, but the model is studied only for a single gateway and a single client. In this study, we consider a UPN network with multiple gateways and multiple clients and we focus on accessing and sharing bandwidth, which is the most fundamental problem faced by today's network operators and users.…”

Section: A Background and Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Distribution Games: A New Class of Games With Application to User Provided Networks

Tasci

Shalom²,

Korçak

2022

IEEE Access

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User Provided Network (UPN) is a promising solution for sharing the limited network resources by utilizing user capabilities as a part of the communication infrastructure. In UPNs, it is an important problem to decide how to share the resources among multiple clients in decentralized manner. Motivated by this problem, we introduce a new class of games termed distribution games that can be used to distribute efficiently and fairly the bandwidth capacity among users. We show that every distribution game has at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) and any best response dynamics always converges to such an equilibrium. We consider social welfare functions that are weighted sums of bandwidths allocated to clients. We present tight upper bounds for the price of anarchy and price of stability of these games provided that they satisfy some reasonable assumptions. We define two specific practical instances of distribution games that fit these assumptions. We conduct experiments on one of these instances and demonstrate that in most of the settings the social welfare obtained by the best response dynamics is very close to the optimum. Simulations show that this game also leads to a fair distribution of the bandwidth.

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Section: A Background and Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Background and Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%