Service‐Level Agreement with Dynamic Inventory Policy: The Effect of the Performance Review Period and the Incentive Structure

Abstract

Performance measures are often outlined in the section of the service-level agreement (SLA) of the contract between a supplier and a retailer. They are monitored periodically, and penalty and/or bonus payments are imposed in each performance review period, according to the SLA clauses. Previous studies have mostly considered a static inventory policy in analyzing SLAs. However, in practice, the supplier may have an opportunity to adjust the stock level in each inventory review period, according to the observed performance. This study analyzes the dynamic stocking decision for a supplier facing an SLA where the supplier sells a single product to the retailer. The ready rate is used to measure the performance in an SLA. To this end, models for both lump-sum and linear penalty/bonus structures are developed, and the optimal stocking decisions for a strategic supplier are calculated using the stochastic dynamic programming approach. The results are then compared with the optimal static inventory policy, and new insights are derived to efficiently design an inventory system for the suppliers that are subject to service-level incentives. In addition, we investigate the impact of SLA parameterssuch as the length of the performance review period and incentive structures-on a supplier's performance, with the probability of meeting or exceeding the target service levels and the supplier's cost. We also consider the impact of demand distribution and inventory holding costs. Results show that under lump-sum incentives, a longer performance review period benefits both the supplier and the buyer, given that the average ready rate increases with less variability as the length of the performance review period increases, leading to decrements in the supplier's total costs. In this scenario, there is a higher chance of gaining bonuses/avoiding penalties for a strategic supplier who adopts a dynamic inventory policy. On the other hand, under linear incentives, the impact of the performance review period on the supplier's cost and the performance measure (i.e., ready rate) is complicated and depends on the magnitude of the holding cost and the bonus and/or penalty structure of the contract. Under this scheme, the performance of a static inventory policy is highly dependent on the holding cost because a high holding cost may lead to failure to meet the contract requirements in terms of the service level.

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