Sideband quantum communication at 1  Mbit/s on a metropolitan area network

Gleim, A.V.; Chistyakov, V. V.; Bannik, O. I.; Egorov, V. I.; Buldakov, Nikita V.; Gaidash, Andrei; Kozubov, Anton; Smirnov, S. V.; Kynev, S. M.; Khoruzhnikov, Sergey; Kozlov, S. A.; Васильев, В. Н.

doi:10.1364/jot.84.000362

Cited by 27 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Data transfer rate in the hybrid encryption scheme is about 1 Gbit/s. Up to our knowledge, this is a first in Russia experimental demonstration of quantumsecured data transmission in urban fibre-optic communication lines, while previously announced results were about implementations of QKD protocols only [23,24].…”

Section: Post-processing Procedures and Application Levelmentioning

confidence: 88%

Quantum-Secured Data Transmission in Urban Fiber-Optics Communication Lines

et al. 2018

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Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides information-theoretic security in communications based on the laws of quantum physics. In this work, we report an implementation of quantumsecured data transmission in the infrastructure of Sberbank of Russia in standard communication lines in Moscow The experiment is realized on the basis of the already deployed urban fibre-optic communication channels with significant losses. We realize the decoy-state BB84 QKD protocol using the one-way scheme with polarization encoding for generating keys. Quantum-generated keys are then used for continuous key renewal in the hardware devices for establishing a quantum-secured VPN Tunnel between two offices of Sberbank. The used hybrid approach offers possibilities for longterm protection of the transmitted data, and it is promising for integrating into the already existing information security infrastructure.

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Section: Post-processing Procedures and Application Levelmentioning

confidence: 88%

Quantum-Secured Data Transmission in Urban Fiber-Optics Communication Lines

et al. 2018

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“…The investigated detector has recently been employed in several QKD experiments [30,31] based on SCW prin- ciple [33]. This QKD scheme is promising as a backbone for large-scale quantum network thanks to its high capability for multiplexing [34,35] and robustness against environmental influence on the optical fiber [32,36,37]. In this type of systems the encoding photons are not directly generated by an attenuated laser source but rather appear on spectral sidebands during a phase modulation of light.…”

Section: Attack On Subcarrier-wave Qkdmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For our analysis we have used SCW QKD experimental parameters from Ref. 32: loss in Bob module 6.4 dB, SF extinction ratio 30 dB, and modulation index (the ratio between optical power in the carrier and the two sidebands) of 20. Let Eve prepare the signal states in a way similar to Alice: a spectrum with a strong carrier and two subcarriers.…”

Section: Attack On Subcarrier-wave Qkdmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The purpose of this work is to investigate the vulnerability to the faked-state attack of another single-photon detector, ID Quantique ID210, which is currently commercially available [28] and has recently been used in several QKD setups [29][30][31]. Notably some of these experimental schemes are based on subcarrier-wave (SCW) QKD architecture where quantum states are formed at spectral sidebands of an intense light through phase modulation [32]. In SCW QKD systems a major fraction of the signal is filtered out before detection.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Controlling single-photon detector ID210 with bright light

Chistyakov¹,

Huang²,

Egorov³

et al. 2019

Opt. Express

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We experimentally demonstrate that a single-photon detector ID210 commercially available from ID Quantique is vulnerable to blinding and can be fully controlled by bright illumination. In quantum key distribution, this vulnerability can be exploited by an eavesdropper to perform a fakedstate attack giving her full knowledge of the key without being noticed. We consider the attack on standard BB84 protocol and a subcarrier-wave scheme, and outline a possible countermeasure.

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“…In a source's apparatus, an optical attenuator is usually the last component that optical pulses go through before they are sent to a quantum channel [28,[37][38][39][40][41][42][43][44][45] However, for Eve, the attenuator is the first component she sees, looking at the source's apparatus from the network side. High-power laser damage of other components in QKD systems has been demonstrated before [10,13].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Laser-Damage Attack Against Optical Attenuators in Quantum Key Distribution

Huang

Egorov

et al. 2020

Phys. Rev. Applied

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Many quantum key distribution systems employ a laser followed by an optical attenuator to prepare weak coherent states in the source. Their mean photon number must be pre-calibrated to guarantee the security of key distribution. Here we experimentally show that this calibration can be broken with a high-power laser attack. We have tested four fiber-optic attenuator types used in quantum key distribution systems, and found that two of them exhibit a permanent decrease in attenuation after laser damage. This results in higher mean photon numbers in the prepared states and may allow an eavesdropper to compromise the key.

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Sideband quantum communication at 1 Mbit/s on a metropolitan area network

Cited by 27 publications

References 7 publications

Quantum-Secured Data Transmission in Urban Fiber-Optics Communication Lines

Quantum-Secured Data Transmission in Urban Fiber-Optics Communication Lines

Controlling single-photon detector ID210 with bright light

Laser-Damage Attack Against Optical Attenuators in Quantum Key Distribution

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