Skepticism And Everyday Life

Abstract

According to Sextus Empiricus, the Pyrrhonian skeptics "live in accordance with everyday practice (ιωτικ τ ρησις)" (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [PH] I ). 1 They follow an ordinary life or ordinary experience (μπειρ α) by conforming to common preconceptions (πρ λ ψεις) and appearances (αιν μενα), and this is how their life differs from the life of dogmatic philosophers, which is based on doctrinal beliefs (δ γματα). 2 By insisting on the skeptics' favorable attitude toward everyday life, Sextus wants to support his rejection of the charge that taking a skeptical position entails inactivity and complete detachment from the world: while it is true to say that the skeptics do not live according to philosophical theory, in respect of which they are indeed inactive, they are active as far as non-philosophical practice is concerned (AM XI ). Nevertheless, his intention is not only defensive, but he also sees the skeptics as champions and supporters of ordinary life, which he takes to be superior to a doctrinal or philosophical life. Moreover, the skeptics are allies to everyday life in its struggle against the dogmatists who have risen up against its preconceptions (AM VIII ): "Hence not only do we not conflict with everyday life, but we actually join the struggle on its side, assenting without holding beliefs (δ στως) to what it has found convincing and taking a stand against the private fictions of the dogmatists" (PH II ). 3 The idea that the skeptics follow an ordinary way of living seems to include two things: first, that they are engaged in the activities

Theoria, Praxis, and the Contemplative Life after Plato and Aristotle

“…In this context-where the necessity of xing the rules for the cognitive functioning of a τέχνη is also maintained-a possible di ferent meaning of θεωρία seems to emerge: while grounded on simple observation, For recent, general treatments of Sextus' ethical stance see at least Bett (2010) and Vogt (2010). See also now Grgić (2011).…”