‘Smart’ Public-Private Complementarities in the Transnational Regulatory and Enforcement Space

Abstract

Chapter 1 determines that the main focus of this volume is geared towards establishing whether existing mixes of forms of regulation and instruments have been 'smart' in addressing the causes of environmental pollution and drivers for its prevention in different contexts. 'Smart' has primarily been taken to mean whether a mix of instruments has effectively contributed to the reversal or alleviation of environmental pollution. Underlying this smart mixes notion is the presumption that the combination of regulatory instruments and actors is often more effective than a single instrument and that instruments are thus complementary. As Gunningham and Sinclair have argued, most instruments and actors have strengths and weaknesses in specific circumstances. Combining regulatory instruments and actors into a mix, then, allows us to take advantage of their strengths while compensating for their weaknesses. 1 The challenge for regulators and policy makers has thus been said 'to select and combine those instruments that form a productive and compatible mix', 2 considering that this focus also brings a number of benefits in terms of considering the interaction rather than the choice of regulatory strategies; of concentrating on design aspects thereof; and of nuancing the role of nonstate entities within the framework of global (environmental) governance.Given this presumption of complementarity underlying the smart mixes approach, an important question is not only when one can actually speak of complementarity, but also what factors are relevant in turning this into a 'smart' complementarity. This chapter will address these questions by first fleshing out the meaning of complementarity somewhat further from a regulation theory perspective (Section 2.2). It will then elaborate on this complementarity by zooming in more