Social Resource Allocation in a Mobility System with Connected and Automated Vehicles: A Mechanism Design Problem

A traveler-centric mobility game: Efficiency and stability under rationality and prospect theory

“…So, our mobility game M can ensure in a realistic setting (big city with road infrastructure) with a large number of travelers a sufficiently efficient operation of the mobility system as it could ideally be operated by a central authority "ordering" the travelers how to travel. Our bound in (33) is strong in the sense that it excludes any other possibility of an improvement in efficiency compared to what we can achieve at a NE.…”

“…Since the existence of a NE is guaranteed by Theorem 1 and the mobility game M converges to at least one NE, we can compare the level of inefficiency at a NE to the social optimum (this is exactly what the PoA does). The bound we have derived in (33) under certain conditions ensures the mobility system's inefficiency is guaranteed to remain within a constant, and as the number of travelers…”

“…To understand the innate competition over the scarce resources in transportation and the impact of congestion, pricing game theory has been one of the standard tools that can help us investigate the impact of selfishness and traffic efficiency [27,28]. By adopting a game-theoretic approach, advanced systems have been proposed to assign travelers concrete routes or minimize all travelers' travel time while studying the system's Nash equilibrium (NE) under different mechanisms of congestion pricing [29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36][37]. Key theoretical games used for this approach include routing/congestion games [14,[38][39][40][41], which are a generalization of the standard resource-sharing game of an arbitrary number of resources in a network with a finite number of travelers.…”