Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge

Bacharach, Michael

doi:10.1016/0022-0531(85)90035-3

Cited by 157 publications

(125 citation statements)

References 7 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

117

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…In Bacharach (1985) and Samet (1990), Aumann's theorem is generalized to a nonpartition information structure. In Monderer and Samet (1989), common p-belief, rather than common knowledge, is shown to imply a bound on the probabilistic disagreement.…”

Section: Agreement Theoremsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agreeing to agree

Lehrer

Samet

2011

Theoretical Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Aumann (1976) shows that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event E if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event E, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for E do coincide? We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for this is the existence of a nonempty finite event F with the following two properties. First, it is common knowledge at F that the agents cannot tell whether E occurred. Second, this still holds true at F, when F itself becomes common knowledge.

show abstract

Section: Agreement Theoremsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agreeing to agree

Lehrer

Samet

2011

Theoretical Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The function f satisfies union consistency 4 (Cave, 1983) if for all non-empty, disjoint E 1 , E 2 ⊆ 4 Bacharach (1985) used the term sure-thing principle for the same property.…”

Section: Signals and Consensusmentioning

confidence: 99%

On consensus through communication without a commonly known protocol

Tsakas

Voorneveld

2011

Journal of Mathematical Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…We shall give the generalized notion of information partition in the line of Bacharach [2] as follows.…”

Section: Awareness Belief and Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Welfare for Economy Under Awareness

Horie

Matsuhisa

2005

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. We present the extended notion of pure exchange economy under uncertainty, called an economy with awareness structure, where each trader having a strictly monotone preference makes decision under his/her awareness and belief, and we introduce a generalized notion of equilibrium for the economy, called an expectations equilibrium in awareness. We show the existence theorem of the equilibrium and the fundamental welfare theorem for the economy, i.e., an allocation in the economy is ex-ante Pareto optimal if and only if it is an expectations equilibrium allocation in awareness.

show abstract

Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge

Cited by 157 publications

References 7 publications

Agreeing to agree

Agreeing to agree

On consensus through communication without a commonly known protocol

Welfare for Economy Under Awareness

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About