Some myths about cognitive-behaviour modification

Abstract

The integration of cognitive processes and behaviour change methods, generically known as cognitive-behaviour modification, has sparked off a series of heated arguments about the status of this hybrid (Greenspoon and Lamal, 1978; Ledwidge, 1978; 1979 (a); (b); Mahoney, 1974; 1977; Mahoney and Kazdin 1979; Meichenbaum 1977; 1979; Rachlin, 1977(a); (b); Wolpe, 1976; 1978). At the considerable risk of adding fuel to an already inflamed debate, I have drawn up a list of myths which the opposition to cognitive-behaviour modification has promulgated. Myths are, of course, a potent source of influence, and I am not at all sanguine that labelling the lines of opposition to cognitive-behaviour modification as ‘myths’ will change peoples' cognitions or behaviour. Nevertheless, in the interests of academic debate, and indeed in the pursuit of truth,* I have listed what seem to me to be the essential fallacies in the arguments against the cognitive-behavioural movement.