Speaker-independent Mandarin plosiverecognition with dynamic features and multilayerperceptrons

Abstract

tion rmx = k+s mod O@) and signature verification y'" = ra' mod p) , only the legitimate signer with knowledge of x can generate the signatures to satisfy the verification. Although the attacker can generate bogus signatures in the signature collection protocol, these signatures cannot satisfy the batch verification criterion. There are some other secure ElGamal type signature schemes as proposed in [4] that can also be used to design similar DSA type secure interactive batch verification protocols. We list those schemes in Table 1. Table 1: Secure ElGamal type signature schemes Signature Signature verification y"=r'a' mod 0 p y ' = r w n mod 0 p y'=ra"' mod 0 p sx=rk+m mod 0@) sx=k+mr mod 0@) (4) (r+m)x=k+s mod 0@) y'+"=ra' mod 0 p (5) sx=k+(m+r) mod 0 (p) y'=ra"'*' mod 0 p Conclusion: Instead of using an insecure batch verification criterion as proposed by the Naccache et al. in Eurocrypt '94, we propose several secure batch verification criteria in this Letter. By using the interactive batch verification protocol, the signer follows the signature collection protocol to generate n signatures through interactions with the verifier and the verifier validates all these n signatures at once through the batch verification criterion.