Speaker’s reference, stipulation, and a dilemma for conceptual engineers

Deutsch, Max

doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01416-z

Cited by 52 publications

(41 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…For instance, Cappelen (2018) argues, on the basis of considerations from semantic externalism, that meaning change is mostly inscrutable and not within our control. If true, this would leave a large question mark over the very idea of adopting conceptual engineering as a method or activity to be applied in philosophy and elsewhere (Koch 2018;Riggs 2019;Deutsch 2020).…”

Section: Benefits Of the Dual Content Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Engineering what? On concepts in conceptual engineering

Koch

2020

Synthese

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Conceptual engineers aim to revise rather than describe our concepts. But what are concepts? And how does one engineer them? Answering these questions is of central importance for implementing and theorizing about conceptual engineering. This paper discusses and criticizes two influential views of this issue: semanticism, according to which conceptual engineers aim to change linguistic meanings, and psychologism, according to which conceptual engineers aim to change psychological structures. I argue that neither of these accounts can give us the full story. Instead, I propose and defend the Dual Content View of Conceptual Engineering. On this view, conceptual engineering targets concepts, where concepts are understood as having two (interrelated) kinds of contents: referential content and cognitive content. I show that this view is independently plausible and that it gives us a comprehensive account of conceptual engineering that helps to make progress on some of the most difficult problems surrounding conceptual engineering.

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Section: Benefits Of the Dual Content Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Engineering what? On concepts in conceptual engineering

Koch

2020

Synthese

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“…His efforts would be futile: It is unfeasible to change the meaning of 'cause' in English. The unfeasibility of changing the standing meaning of expressions in languages like English has impelled Cappelen (2018), Deutsch (2020) and, albeit less so, Koch (2018) to hold that conceptual engineers face an implementation problem worth worrying about.…”

Section: Standing Meaningmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As long as there also are metasemantic determinants of M we can control, then, provided that it is sufficient to change these to change M, it is feasible to change M. Thus, Deutsch is mistaken when he writes ' [E]xternalism does imply that semantic shifts require corresponding shifts in external factors: stipulation, by itself, never suffices'. (Deutsch 2020). It may be that a speaker's intention or act of stipulation does not suffice for a change in meaning in a given case.…”

Section: Standing Meaningmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Conceptual engineering and the implementation problem

Jorem

2020

Inquiry

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Conceptual engineers seek to revise or replace the devices we use to speak and think. If this amounts to an effort to change what natural language expressions mean, conceptual engineers will have a hard time. It is largely unfeasible to change the meaning of e.g. 'cause' in English. Conceptual engineers may therefore seem unable to make the changes they aim to make. This is what I call 'the implementation problem'. In this paper, I argue that the implementation problem dissolves if we expand our view of how conceptual engineers could implement the products of their work. I describe four implementation options: Standing Meaning, Meaning Modulation, Speaker-Meaning and Different Language. I query the feasibility and worth of pursuing these options. Unless each option fails because it is unfeasible or not worthwhile, conceptual engineers do not face an implementation problem worth worrying about. I argue that some of the options are feasible and worthwhile, and therefore, that conceptual engineers do not face an implementation problem worth worrying about.

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“…has recently argued that conceptual engineering does not deserve the attention it currently receives; for upon scrutiny, it does not provide philosophers with the implementable and underappreciated methodological tool that its advocates claim it does (Deutsch 2020). This paper responds to Deutsch's critical take on conceptual engineering.…”

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confidence: 91%

There is no dilemma for conceptual engineering. Reply to Max Deutsch

Koch

2020

Philos Stud

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Max Deutsch (in: Philosophical studies, online-first. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01416-z, 2020) has recently argued that conceptual engineering is stuck in a dilemma. If it is construed as the activity of revising the semantic meanings of existing terms, then it faces an unsurmountable implementation problem. If, on the other hand, it is construed as the activity of introducing new technical terms, then it becomes trivial. According to Deutsch, this conclusion need not worry us, however, for conceptual engineering is ill-motivated to begin with. This paper responds to Deutsch by arguing, first, that there is a third construal of conceptual engineering, neglected by him, which renders it both implementable and non-trivial, and second, that even the more ambitious project of changing semantic meanings is no less feasible than other normative projects we currently pursue. Lastly, the value of conceptual engineering is defended against Deutsch’s objections.

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Speaker’s reference, stipulation, and a dilemma for conceptual engineers

Cited by 52 publications

References 23 publications

Engineering what? On concepts in conceptual engineering

Engineering what? On concepts in conceptual engineering

Conceptual engineering and the implementation problem

There is no dilemma for conceptual engineering. Reply to Max Deutsch

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