Speaking of Essence:

Torza, Alessandro

doi:10.1093/pq/pqv036

Cited by 23 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…The latter option does not seem promising. Torza (2015) has presented a convincing formal argument against the possibility of reducing the essence in terms of any operator definable in first order modal language. He also presented some interesting arguments against more sophisticated forms of modalism, involving impossible worlds.…”

Section: Too Much Essentialism?mentioning

confidence: 99%

New powers for Dispositionalism

Giannini

2020

Synthese

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Establishing Dispositionalism as a viable theory of modality requires the successful fulfilment of two tasks: (i) showing that all modal truths can be derived from truths about actual powers, and (ii) offering a suitable metaphysics of powers. These two tasks are intertwined: difficulties in one can affect the chances of success in the other. In this paper, I generalise an objection to Dispositionalism by Jessica Leech and argue that the theory in its present form is ill-suited to account for de re truths about merely possible entities. I argue that such difficulty is rooted in a problem in the metaphysics of powers. In particular, I contend that the well-known tension between two key principle of powers ontology, namely Directedness (all powers are “for” their manifestation) and Independence (some powers might fail to bring about their manifestation) has received an unsatisfactory solution so far, and that it is this unsatisfactory solution concerning the status of “unmanifested manifestations” that makes it hard for Dispositionalism to account for mere possibilia. I develop a novel account of the status of unmanifested manifestations and an overall metaphysics of powers which allows to better respond to Leech's objection and handle mere possibilia. The central idea of the proposal is that unmanifested manifestations are akin to mere logical existents, and are best characterised as non-essentially non-located entities.

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Section: Too Much Essentialism?mentioning

confidence: 99%

New powers for Dispositionalism

Giannini

2020

Synthese

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“…However, B&S's discussion does not suggest that they are thinking of essences as consequential. Further objections to CAE can be found in(Torza 2015) and(Steward 2015).9 Denby's version varies from IAE only in taking intrinsicality in the second condition to be global, i.e. ϕ must be intrinsic simpliciter, not just intrinsicality had by o.…”

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confidence: 99%

A Modal Account of Essence

2020

Metaphysics

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According to the simple modal account of essence, an object has a property essentially just in case it has it in every world in which it exists. As many have observed, the simple modal account is implausible for a number of reasons. This has led to various proposals for strengthening the account, for example, by adding a restriction to the intrinsic or sparse properties. I argue, however, that these amendments to the simple modal account themselves fail. Drawing on lessons from these failures, I propose a new version of a modal account, inspired by Ruth Barcan Marcus'sdefenseofthecoherenceofquantifiedmodallogic,accordingtowhichanobjecthas a property essentially just in case (i) it has it in every world in which it exists, (ii) the property is discriminating (or non-trivial), and (iii) the property is qualitative. The resulting account of essence does not face any of the standard objections other accounts face, and I defend it from other potential objections.

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“…5 Other options include (but are not limited to) endorsing skepticism vis-à-vis essentialism or defending specific metaphysical frameworks such as Brogaard and Salerno (2007), Correia (2007) and Zalta (2006). For a discussion of these views see Torza (2015).…”

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confidence: 99%

Essence, modality, and intrinsicality

Bovey

2020

Synthese

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Kit Fine (Philos Perspect 8:1-16, 1994) famously objected against the idea that essence can be successfully analyzed in terms of de re necessity. In response, I want to explore a novel, interesting, but controversial modal account of essence in terms of intrinsicality and grounding. In the first section, I will single out two theoretical requirements that any essentialist theory should meet-the essentialist desideratum and the essentialist challenge-in order to clarify Fine's objections. In the second section, I will assess Denby's improved modal account, which appeals to the notion of intrinsicality, and argue that it is untenable. In the third section, I will explain how, when combined with a modal-existential criterion, a hyperintensional account of intrinsicality-in the same vein as Bader (J Philos 110(10):525-563, 2013) and Rosen (in: Hale and Hoffman (eds) Modality: Metaphysics, logic, and epistemology, Oxford, OUP, 2010)-can help successfully address Fine's counterexamples. In the fourth section, I will evaluate how this novel analysis of essence stands with respect to sortal, origin, and natural kinds essentialism and discuss potential objections and difficulties. Keywords Essence • Essentialism • Modality • Intrinsicality • Grounding • Parthood 1 Introduction: the essentialist desideratum and the essentialist challenge In his influential paper Essence and Modality (1994) Kit Fine argues that, as they stand, modal analyses of essence-both the conditional and the unconditional variants (Correia 2007)-bring about controversial and counterintuitive results. In order to see why, let us consider the conditional analysis for the present discussion: CMA: x is essentially F def. necessarily, if x exists, then x is F.

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Speaking of Essence:

Cited by 23 publications

References 20 publications

New powers for Dispositionalism

New powers for Dispositionalism

A Modal Account of Essence

Essence, modality, and intrinsicality

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