Stable multi‐player evolutionary game for two‐choice resource allocation problems

Naghavi, Parnia; Kebriaei, Hamed; Shah-Mansouri, Vahid

doi:10.1049/iet-cta.2018.5599

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…In response to this nuanced reality, Nowak and May introduced the concept of the networked evolutionary game (NEG) [2], focusing on spatial lattice. Recently, NEG has emerged as a crucial focus in research endeavors, extending its applications across various domains, encompassing social networks [3,4] and economic networks [5]. By revealing the dynamics underpinning these diverse systems, NEG has become a crucial and versatile analytical tool.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modeling and optimization of networked evolutionary game based on incomplete information with switched topologies

Gui,

Gao,

2024

IET Control Theory & Appl

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In the realm of evolutionary game theory, the majority of scenarios involve players with incomplete knowledge, specially regarding their opponents' actions and payoffs compounded by the ever‐shifting landscape of players' interactions. These dynamics present formidable challenges in both the analysis and optimization of game evolution. To address this, a novel model named the networked evolutionary game (NEG) is proposed based on incomplete information with switched topologies. This model captures situations where players possess limited insight into their opponents' benefits, yet make decisions based on their own payoffs while adapting to different networks and new players. To bridge the gap between incomplete and complete information games, R. Selten's transformation method is leveraged, a renowned approach that converts an incomplete information game into an interim agent game, thereby establishing the equivalence of pure Nash equilibria (NE) in both scenarios. Employing the semi‐tensor product (STP) of matrices, a powerful tool in logistic system, the evolution of the model is articulated through algebraic relationships. This enables to unravel the patterns of game evolution and identify the corresponding pure Nash equilibria. By introducing control players, strategically positioned within the game, optimized control is facilitated over the evolutionary trajectory, ultimately leading to convergence towards an optimal outcome. Finally, these concepts are illustrated with a practical example within the paper.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modeling and optimization of networked evolutionary game based on incomplete information with switched topologies

Gui,

Gao,

2024

IET Control Theory & Appl

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“…Evolutionary game theory is an efficient solution to animal behavior prediction in resource competition [23], [24], and has been gradually applied to other research domains. In [25], the problem of multi-player evolutionary game with two strategies is considered to analyze how users randomly select different radio access technologies. A two-group and a three-group asymmetric evolutionary games in typical scenarios of electricity market are employed in [26] to analyze how government policies and other factors influence the electricity market.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game-theoretic Analysis for Residential Users Considering Integrated Demand Response

Gao

Chen

Qin

et al. 2021

Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy

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As an important part of demand side, residential users have the characteristics of imperfect rationality and strong randomness, which are rarely considered in the existing study. Moreover, to effectively improve the energy efficiency, integrated demand response (IDR) is proposed as an effective measure to reduce the local energy supply pressure. This paper focuses on a scenario for IDR programs, in which the intelligent building aggregator (IBA) wants to encourage residential users to participate in IDR according to a proper contract price policy. To analyze how the participation degree tendency evolves over time, an evolutionary game approach is proposed considering residential users'bounded-rationality. A symmetric evolutionary game model and an asymmetric evolutionary game model are established, and the stability of equilibrium points in the above models is proven. Simulation results show that different contract price policies will obviously influence residential users'strategy, and affect the stable equilibrium points of the evolutionary game. The simulation results provide an effective reference for IBA to set proper and effective price incentives.

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Stable multi‐player evolutionary game for two‐choice resource allocation problems

Cited by 2 publications

References 45 publications

Modeling and optimization of networked evolutionary game based on incomplete information with switched topologies

Modeling and optimization of networked evolutionary game based on incomplete information with switched topologies

Evolutionary Game-theoretic Analysis for Residential Users Considering Integrated Demand Response

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