Strategy as a Social Science

Ayson, Robert

doi:10.1201/9781003071167-7

Cited by 2 publications

(10 citation statements)

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“…Moreover, focusing on the social ontology behind Schelling's account of interdependent decisions explains the pluridisciplinary aspect of his work (again that is rarely stressed excepting in Ayson, 2004;Colman, 2006;Rivzi, 2007). Economics cannot be conceived as a "closed-system" in Schelling's account.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Understanding human behavior and her relationship with her social and cultural environment requires to appeal to psychology, social psychology, sociology, information theory, organization theory, etc. (see Ayson, 2004).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To portray more "realistic" players, Schelling draws on psychology (and especially on Gestalt psychology) and in social psychology (Schelling (1980(Schelling ( [1960Ayson, 2004). He reincorporates in individuals' decision making, in game theory, some psychological assumptions.…”

Section: The Conception Of Individual Economic Agents and Their Rationalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since in both cases, the basis of his contribution, is purposive individuals, this statement is challenging. This explains why the cornerstone of Schelling's methodologies is experimentation (for a comparative claims see Innocenti, 2007, p. 410), and why he is reluctant to use sophisticated mathematics (Ayson, 2004;Colman, 2006;Innocenti, 2007;Rivzi, 2007). 19 Schelling's use of experimental method early begins in his theory of games.…”

Section: What Formalism For a "Theory Of Interdependent Decisions"?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2 These involvements shape Schelling's thinking. They constitute his raw material for theory building (Ayson, 2004), and in particular, they can explain his specific epistemology. Schelling has always been concerned with the applicability of economic theories and models, with the realism of both their hypothesis and conclusions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The ontology of Schelling’s “Theory of Interdependent Decisions”

Larrouy¹

2018

The Individual and the Other in Economic Thought

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The present paper offers a methodological contribution on Schelling's insight into game theory drawing both on his proposition for a "reorientation of game theory" and his dynamic models of residential segregation. It aims to show how these respective works exhibit coherence in Schelling's thinking. It is often claimed that Schelling criticizes standard game theory without proposing any conceptual solution. To the contrary, I assert that the methodological constraints Schelling identifies in standard game theory support the proposition of a new type of modeling in the dynamic models of residential segregation: the first agent based modeling. I argue that the agent-based models provide a theoretic ground to formalize the methodological innovations proposed in his "reorientation of game theory." To understand such a claim I stress the social ontology underlined in Schelling's conception of a "theory of interdependent decisions."

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Conception Of Individual Economic Agents and Their Rationalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: What Formalism For a "Theory Of Interdependent Decisions"?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The ontology of Schelling’s “Theory of Interdependent Decisions”

Larrouy¹

2018

The Individual and the Other in Economic Thought

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Commitment, Cold War, and the battles of the self: Thomas Schelling on behavior control

Fontaine

2024

J History Behavioral Science

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Economist Nobelist Thomas C. Schelling (1921–2016) is known for his contribution to the analysis of international conflict and many see him as the Cold Warrior par excellence. At a time of great uncertainties and dangers, Schelling combined a deep understanding of strategic analysis, a detailed knowledge of US commitments around the world and an inimitable talent for dissecting everyday behavior, which made him a think tank all on his own. When he turned to the analysis of bargaining in the mid‐1950s, one question dominated policy discussions: “How to demonstrate the US commitment to the ‘free world’”? Schelling answered unequivocally: By restricting one's choices so as to shift others' expectations and thereby influence their behavior in the desired direction. By the mid‐1970s, after he had broken with the US administration and joined the Committee on Substance Abuse and Habitual Behavior, Schelling transposed the tactics deployed in international conflict to the analysis of individuals trying to achieve self‐control. In the process, he reproduced the logic of military conflict at the level of the self. The view of a conflicted self itself comprised of two selves made restricted choice the daily routine of individuals who wish to avoid the negative consequences of their present behavior in the future while it promised those who enjoy unbounded freedom of choice an unsettling future.

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Strategy as a Social Science

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

The ontology of Schelling’s “Theory of Interdependent Decisions”

The ontology of Schelling’s “Theory of Interdependent Decisions”

Commitment, Cold War, and the battles of the self: Thomas Schelling on behavior control

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