Study on Low-Carbon Technology Innovation Strategies through Government–University–Enterprise Cooperation under Carbon Trading Policy

Wang, Junwu; Song, Yinghui; Li, Mao; Yang, Cong; Guo, Feng

doi:10.3390/su14159381

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 43 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…They found that the regulatory policies could not always promote remanufacturing. Wang et al [24] studied the differential game of low-carbon technology innovation among governments, universities, and enterprises under the carbon-trading policy, established the equilibrium between technological innovation effort and environmental management effort, and found that the carbon trading price could significantly affect technological innovation efforts.…”

Section: Game On Carbon-emission Reduction Between Governments and En...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Governments’ and Enterprises’ Carbon-Emission Reduction

Li,

Gao,

2024

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

With the increasingly serious problem of global climate change, many countries are positively promoting carbon-emission-reduction actions. In order to deeply explore the interaction between enterprises’ carbon-emission reduction and governments’ regulation, this paper builds evolutionary game models between governments and enterprises under the reward-and-punishment mechanism. The peer-incentive mechanism is introduced to incentivize enterprises to reduce carbon emissions and coordinate governments and enterprises. The evolutionary-stability strategies are obtained by solving the evolutionary game models. The stability of equilibrium points under different situations is theoretically and numerically studied. The results show that the existence of peer incentives makes enterprises more inclined to positively reduce carbon emissions and governments more inclined to positively regulate. A sufficiently large peer fund can always encourage enterprises to choose positive carbon-reduction emission strategies, while governments choose positive regulation strategies. Not only the increasing rewards and fines but also lowering regulatory costs will promote carbon-emission-reduction behaviors of enterprises. Peer incentives are more effective in promoting positive emission reduction of enterprises compared with rewards and punishments. This study can provide important guidance for governments to formulate regulatory strategies and for enterprises to formulate emission-reduction strategies.

show abstract

Section: Game On Carbon-emission Reduction Between Governments and En...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Governments’ and Enterprises’ Carbon-Emission Reduction

Li,

Gao,

2024

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The primary goal of the low-carbon policy is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and achieve sustainable development [141]. The object of the low-carbon trading policy is to control carbon emission by constructing a carbon emission trading pricing mechanism [142].…”

Section: Impact Of Low-carbon Trading Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

A Review of Energy Industry Chain and Energy Supply Chain

Zhang

Tian

et al. 2022

Energies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The reduction of carbon emissions from the energy industry chain and the coordinated development of the energy supply chain have attracted widespread attention. This paper conducts a systematic review of the existing literature on the energy industry chain and energy supply chain. Based on the analytical results, this paper finds that research gaps exist in the studies of energy consumption structure and resource consumption in energy industry chain. In addition, the studies of coordinated operation mechanisms, risk control and the impact of government policies on the energy supply chain still have some shortcomings. Furthermore, this paper shows that the exploitation and utilization of renewable energy and the sustainable development of the energy industry chain and supply chain have become the major focus of scholars and governments in recent years. Accordingly, this article finally presents the future research prospects and provides managerial insights for policy makers and enterprise managers to accelerate the development of renewable energy resources and to achieve green, low-carbon, coordinated and sustainable development.

show abstract

“…In recent years, China's CO 2 emissions continued to increase, especially since 2000, carbon emissions continued to increase rapidly, and China became the world's largest country in terms of carbon emissions, and the issue of carbon emission reduction in China became the focus of the international community. In the face of increasingly serious environmental problems, China put forward the goal of "peaking carbon emissions by 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality by 2060" [3], and brought this goal into the overall layout of ecological civilization construction to achieve the goal of low-carbon transformation and contribute to global climate governance.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategies of Participants in the Carbon Trading Market—An Analysis Based on the Evolutionary Game

Wang

2023

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

To effectively understand the collaborative and evolutionary mechanisms of three stakeholders in carbon trading namely, government, emission reduction enterprises, and emission control enterprises, it is important to identify the factors that affect decision-making behaviors amongst game players, ultimately contributing to the goal of “double carbon”. In this study, we constructed a tripartite game model, analyzing the selection mechanism for game strategies related to carbon trading participants through replicated dynamic equations. We also discussed the main factors that influence the evolutionary and stable outcomes of carbon trading through scenario simulations. Additionally, we introduced prospect theory to examine the impact of risk sensitivity and loss avoidance levels amongst decision-makers on the optimal outcome of the system. Our findings reveal that in the initial game model, the three decision-makers show a cyclical behavior pattern, but the system stabilizes in the optimal equilibrium state (1,1,1) when certain conditions are satisfied. Furthermore, the initial willingness of decision-makers impacts the ability of the game system to reach a stable point. Moreover, larger values for the risk sensitivity coefficient and loss avoidance coefficient can promote the evolution of the game system toward an optimal, stable point. Based on these results, targeted countermeasures are proposed to promote activity within the carbon trading market, such as giving more institutional guarantees to carbon trading and stabilizing the carbon price.

show abstract

Study on Low-Carbon Technology Innovation Strategies through Government–University–Enterprise Cooperation under Carbon Trading Policy

Cited by 7 publications

References 43 publications

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Governments’ and Enterprises’ Carbon-Emission Reduction

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Governments’ and Enterprises’ Carbon-Emission Reduction

A Review of Energy Industry Chain and Energy Supply Chain

Strategies of Participants in the Carbon Trading Market—An Analysis Based on the Evolutionary Game

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About