Sub-types of Semi-presidentialism and Political Deadlock

Abstract

This article argues that semi-presidentialism can be classified into five sub-types: (1) president-dominant semi-presidentialism, (2) premier-dominant semi-presidentialism, (3) parliament-dominant semi-presidentialism, (4) cohabitation semi-presidentialism, and (5) balance-of-powers semi-presidentialism. This framework differs from previous frameworks by emphasizing the constitutional powers of parliament in tandem with two more standard variables, namely, the powers of the president and the party situation in parliament. On the basis of this framework, it suggests that when two opposing branches (president and parliament) achieve parity, they are more likely to come into conflict as regards the passage of legislation. In particular, it is hypothesized that balance-of-powers semi-presidentialism is much more likely to generate political conflicts and political deadlock than any other subtype, even to the point of breaking down a democratic regime.

Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy

“…7. Tsai (2008) provides an interesting suggestion for categorizing semi-presidential systems into five subtypes: president-dominant; premier-dominant; parliamentdominant; cohabitation; and balance-of-powers. His criteria of classification include the constitutional powers of the president and parliament, and the party situation in parliament.…”

“…It is important to separate institutional and extra-constitutional variables, when developing subtypes of semi-presidential regimes. Thus, contrary to Tsai (2008), I would argue that cohabitation should not be considered a subtype of semi-presidentialism, but a situation in which all semi-presidential systems can theoretically find themselves, depending on shifts in partisan alignment. 7 The actual performance of a semi-presidential regime in a situation of cohabitation is likely to depend in part on the distribution of constitutional powers, and in part on patterns of elite interaction that have developed over time.…”

“…Where powers are more evenly balanced between president and prime minister/parliament, the concern is that disagreements between the president and the prime minister and parliament can also easily degenerate into political gridlock, with protracted power struggles between the two executives, irrespective of whether they belong to the same party or coalition, or whether they find themselves in a situation of cohabitation (Elgie 2005: 107-108). According to Tsai (2008), this is particularly likely to happen where a strong president faces a strong parliament, which tends to breed intransigence on the part of the two institutions with separate electorally mandated legitimacy. 6 In contrast, the expectation is that in countries where power is concentrated with the prime minister and where the president serves more of a representative role, there is a greater chance of democratic survival.…”

“…6 In contrast, the expectation is that in countries where power is concentrated with the prime minister and where the president serves more of a representative role, there is a greater chance of democratic survival. This is most likely to happen in premier-presidential systems (Elgie 2005: 105-107;Tsai 2008). Authority patterns are here believed to be clearer, with little incentive for the personalization of presidential power.…”

The perils of semi-presidentialism: Confidence in political institutions in contemporary democracies

“…Subtypes of the semi-presidential system may lead to different policy outcomes and a differing likelihood of executive conflict (Raunio, 2012; Roper, 2002; Tsai, 2008). 4 Even so, the dual-legitimacy problem tends to occur in all subtypes of this system, whether the president can only govern with the support of the legislature or the government is responsible to the president and parliament (Elgie, 2011).…”