Subscription Mechanisms for Network Formation

Mutuswami, Suresh; Winter, Eyal

doi:10.1006/jeth.2001.2920

Cited by 52 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 21 publications

(48 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…But note that superadditivity in links, superadditivity of cooperative games and "monotonicity" as in Currarini and Morelli (2000) [5] and Mutuswami and Winter (2002) [7] imply our condition but not viceversa. So, this complexity seems to be the cost of generality.…”

Section: E¢ Ciency Analysismentioning

confidence: 79%

“…Currarini and Morelli (2000) [5] and Mutuswami and Winter (2002) [7] raise the importance of sequentiality and non group bargaining as all their SPE are e¢ cient for a large class of value functions. The result is obtained as the e¢ cient network is not "blocked" and so can block ine¢ cient ones.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These constrained demands (in the e¢ cient network) can always block n decreasing outside options (as for total payo¤ monotonicity in players'size of components) as these can o¤er better prospects even though these are decreasing too. As outside options di¤er in Mutuswami and Winter (2002) [7], payo¤ predictions di¤er. In the latter case, results also hold if there are externalities and even without monotonicity as sorts of "transfers" with contingent cost contributions across components are possible (so as in Bloch and Jackson (2007) [4], the same results but in a sequential game) in variations of their game.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The criticism applies neither to Currarini and Morelli (2000) [5] nor to Mutuswami and Winter (2002) [7] as their games resemble bargaining without groups and counterproposals, a degenerate case in our "family" of games. It applies "whenever players rather than coalitions propose coalitions".…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Networks with Group Counterproposals

Nieva

2008

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Networks with Group Counterproposals SummaryWe study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical monotonicity. The n-player group version always yields efficiency. Keywords AbstractWe study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and su¢ cient conditions for e¢ ciency in terms of cyclical monotonicity. The n-player group version always yields e¢ ciency.

show abstract

Section: E¢ Ciency Analysismentioning

confidence: 79%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Networks with Group Counterproposals

Nieva

2008

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This is explored in Currarini and Morelli (2000), Mutuswami and Winter (2000) and Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001b). As shown by Currarini and Morelli (2000), at least for some bargaining protocols, e ciency can be regained in some settings.…”

Section: Definitions Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strongly Stable Networks

Jackson

Nouweland

2003

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We analyze the formation of networks among individuals. In particular, we examine the existence of networks that are stable against changes in links by any coalition of individuals. We show that to investigate the existence of such strongly stable networks one can restrict focus on a component-wise egalitarian allocation of value. We show that when such strongly stable networks exist they coincide with the set of e cient networks (those maximizing the total productive value). We show that the existence of strongly stable networks is equivalent to core existence in a derived cooperative game and use that result to characterize the class of value functions for which there exist strongly stable networks via a "top convexity" condition on the value function on networks. We also consider a variation on strong stability where players can make side payments, and examine situations where value functions may be non-anonymous -depending on player labels.

show abstract