Supply Chain Contract Choice with Different Behavior Preferences of Retailer

Wang, Yong-Long; Zheng, Xinyu; Ji-rong, Cai; Zheng, Yang

doi:10.1155/2021/7894885

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…After 60 years of research, a number of mature theoretical systems have been formed. Supply chain contract has become an important method to realize the coordination of supply chain [24,50] . Coordination of the supply chain can obtain through the repurchase contract [31,56] , and the profit of decentralized decision-making was far lower than the profit of supply chain coordination [11,30,37,44] .…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on contract coordination of supply chain under dual behavior preference based on Stackelberg model

Cheng¹,

Yu²

2023

Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Engineering Management and Information Science, EMIS 2023, February 24-26, 2

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Based on the Stackelberg model between suppliers and retailers, fairness concern and loss avoidance are introduced into suppliers and retailers in supply chain. This paper discusses whether the balance of supply chain can be realized through the repurchase contract and repurchase-revenue sharing contract when they have dual psychological preferences. Establishing utility functions based on two different contracts, combined with the expression of utility functions, discuss the feasibility and necessary conditions of pursuing utility maximization and realizing supply chain coordination when supply chain members have dual preferences. Through the derivation of mathematical model and the analysis of numerical examples, it is concluded that suppliers and retailers with dual behavior preference can achieve supply chain coordination through repurchase contract when they have a certain degree of fairness concern and loss avoidance, but can not achieve supply chain coordination through repurchase-revenue sharing contract. In this process, the utility of the two sides will also change with the degree of their fair concerns and loss avoidance. Whether the two parties can realize their interest is the key to the final cooperation.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on contract coordination of supply chain under dual behavior preference based on Stackelberg model

Cheng¹,

Yu²

2023

Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Engineering Management and Information Science, EMIS 2023, February 24-26, 2

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show abstract

“…Nevertheless, most of the existing studies on risk preferences have only considered the cognitive characteristics of a single type of decision makers. To be specific, some scholars [45], [46] have discussed only the risk preferences of suppliers, while some scholars [47], [48] have analyzed only the risk preferences of retailers. A small number of studies have comprehensively considered the cognitive characteristics of all decision makers in the supply chain.…”

Section: Studies On Supply Chain Decision Making Under Different Risk...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Cross-Border E-Commerce Supply Chain Decision-Making Considering Out-of-Stock Aversion Risk and Waste Aversion Risk

Xin

Zhou

2023

IEEE Access

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With the increase of black swan incidents, cross-border e-commerce supply chains are facing more risks. Out-of-stock aversion and waste aversion are examined as the risk preferences of cross-border e-commerce platforms and overseas warehouses based on prospect theory. A cross-border e-commerce supply chain decision making model with four different risk preference combinations is constructed under the Stackelberg game decision making model. The relationships between the risk preference coefficient and the ordering strategy for the overseas warehouse and the pricing strategy for the cross-border e-commerce platform are analyzed through the numerical analysis of an arithmetic case. The results show that: 1) the cross-border e-commerce platform at the leading position has a more prominent impact on the performance of the cross-border e-commerce supply chain; 2) when the overseas warehouse is out-of-stock averse and the cross-border e-commerce platform is waste averse, both the order quantity and pricing increase with the increase of the risk preference coefficient; when the overseas warehouse is waste averse and the cross-border e-commerce platform is out-of-stock averse, both the order quantity and pricing decrease with the increase of the risk preference coefficient; 3) when the overseas warehouse and the cross-border e-commerce platform have the same risk preference, the overseas warehouse adopts a more aggressive ordering strategy when they are more out-of-stock averse, and adopts a more conservative ordering strategy when they are more waste averse.INDEX TERMS Cross-border e-commerce supply chain, risk preference, stackelberg game, out-of-stock aversion, waste aversion.

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Supply Chain Contract Choice with Different Behavior Preferences of Retailer

Cited by 2 publications

References 15 publications

Research on contract coordination of supply chain under dual behavior preference based on Stackelberg model

Research on contract coordination of supply chain under dual behavior preference based on Stackelberg model

Cross-Border E-Commerce Supply Chain Decision-Making Considering Out-of-Stock Aversion Risk and Waste Aversion Risk

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