Team reasoning without a hive mind

Radžvilas, Mantas; Karpus, Jurgis

doi:10.1016/j.rie.2021.09.003

Cited by 1 publication

(2 citation statements)

References 35 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Alternatively, if it is common knowledge that the Receiver is only able to open one box in any pursuing their own objectives. See Radzvilas & Karpus [48] for related discussion in the context of the team reasoning approach to coordinated behaviour. case (so while it is common knowledge that there are two bananas, at best one banana can be obtained), then the rationale for pointing out the scorpion evaporates, and the Sender typically 'points at' one of the bananas by marking the relevant box, which the Receiver then opens.…”

Section: Virtual Bargaining As a Model Of Social Interactionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 13 This appears contrary to the dictum of methodological individualism in social science (for a sophisticated discussion, see [ 47 ]), but may not be, because the bargaining approach explains how ‘we-like’ preferences emerge from individuals each pursuing their own objectives. See Radzvilas & Karpus [ 48 ] for related discussion in the context of the team reasoning approach to coordinated behaviour. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

How could we make a social robot? A virtual bargaining approach

Chater

2023

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

What is required to allow an artificial agent to engage in rich, human-like interactions with people? I argue that this will require capturing the process by which humans continually create and renegotiate ‘bargains’ with each other. These hidden negotiations will concern topics including who should do what in a particular interaction, which actions are allowed and which are forbidden, and the momentary conventions governing communication, including language. Such bargains are far too numerous, and social interactions too rapid, for negotiation to be conducted explicitly. Moreover, the very process of communication presupposes innumerable momentary agreements concerning the meaning of communicative signals, thus raising the threat of circularity. Thus, the improvised ‘social contracts’ that govern our interactions must be implicit. I draw on the recent theory of virtual bargaining, according to which social partners mentally simulate a process of negotiation, to outline how these implicit agreements can be made, and note that this viewpoint raises substantial theoretical and computational challenges. Nonetheless, I suggest that these challenges must be met if we are ever to create AI systems that can work collaboratively alongside people, rather than serving primarily as valuable special-purpose computational tools. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'Cognitive artificial intelligence'.

show abstract

Section: Virtual Bargaining As a Model Of Social Interactionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%