Technology driven organizational structure of the firm

Brink, René van den; Ruys, P.H.M.

doi:10.1007/s10436-007-0087-x

Cited by 9 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…First, games with a permission structure allow any game, but weighted digraph games only consider additive games. On the other hand, to have permission to cooperate, a player in a game with (conjunctive) permission structure needs permission from all its superiors, but in a weighted 22 In van den Brink and Gilles (2000), a similar game and measure are defined, but a node does not 'share' in the power over itself, i.e. they consider the game v δ,…”

Section: Locally Restricted Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In van den Brink (2008) and van den Brink and Ruys (2008), games with a permission structure are applied to model hierarchically structured firms. This is a special class of games with a permission structure that are not peer group games.…”

Section: Hierarchically Structured Firmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hart and Moore (1990) and Rajan and Zingales (1998). In van den Brink (2008), a more general class of wage systems is considered. In Ruys et al (2000), different wage systems are related to the cultural dimensions of Hofstede (1980 …”

Section: Corollary 2 For Every Hierarchical Production Game (V D) Wimentioning

confidence: 99%

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Games with a permission structure - A survey on generalizations and applications

Brink

2017

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In the field of cooperative games with restricted cooperation, various restrictions on coalition formation are studied. The most studied restrictions are those that arise from restricted communication and hierarchies. This survey discusses several models of hierarchy restrictions and their relation with communication restrictions. In the literature, there are results on game properties, Harsanyi dividends, core stability, and various solutions that generalize existing solutions for TU-games. In this survey, we mainly focus on axiomatizations of the Shapley value in different models of games with a hierarchically structured player set, and their applications. Not only do these axiomatizations provide insight in the Shapley value for these models, but also by considering the types of axioms that characterize the Shapley value, we learn more about different network structures. A central model of games with hierarchies is that of games with a permission structure where players in a cooperative transferable utility game are part of a permission structure in the sense that there are players that need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate. This permission structure is represented by a directed graph. Generalizations of this model are, for example, games on antimatroids, and games with a local permission structure. Besides discussing these generalizations, we briefly discuss some applications, in particular auction games and hierarchically structured firms.This invited paper is discussed in the comments available at

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Section: Locally Restricted Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Hierarchically Structured Firmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Games with a permission structure - A survey on generalizations and applications

Brink

2017

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“…Other papers that have used cooperative game theory to analyze the hierarchical firm are van den Brink and Ruys (2008) and van den Brink (2008). van den Brink and Ruys (2008) also apply the permission value to a hierarchical firm but their focus is on firm size/structure. In addition to linear technology, they also analyze other CES production technologies such as the Cobb-Douglas technology.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…van denBrink and Ruys (2008) also incorporate such loss of control in their model, which they refer to as "agency costs".…”

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confidence: 99%

Assignment of heterogeneous agents in trees under the permission value

2019

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We investigate assignment of heterogeneous agents in trees where the payoff is given by the permission value. We focus on optimal hierarchies, namely those, for which the payoff of the top agent is maximized. For additive games, such hierarchies are always cogent, namely, more productive agents occupy higher positions. The result can be extended to non-additive games with appropriate restrictions on the value function. Next, we consider auctions where agents bid for positions in a vertical hierarchy of depth 2. Under standard auctions, usually this results in a non-cogent hierarchy. Keywords Permission value • Hierarchies • Auctions JEL Classification C71 • C72 We thank Rob Gilles and the participants of the Bilbao-Norwich-Malaga Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Norwich, United Kingdom for helpful comments and discussion. We are particularly indebted to the editor and two anonymous referees for their detailed and extremely useful suggestions. Rajnish Kumar acknowledges financial support provided by British Council Grant UGC-UKIERI 2016-17-059.

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