Technology spillovers and stability of international climate coalitions

Nagashima, Miyuki; Dellink, Rob

doi:10.1007/s10784-008-9079-1

Cited by 21 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…They show that technology agreements are usually more stable but not necessarily more environmentally effective. Nagashima and Dellink (2008) use the STACO model to show the effects of spillovers of existing technology on international environmental agreements: global emission reductions increase, of course, but the stability of the agreement hardly changes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Technology Agreements with Heterogeneous Countries

Hoel

Zeeuw

2013

SSRN Journal

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For sufficiently low abatement costs many countries might undertake significant emission reductions even without any international agreement on emission reductions. We consider a situation where a coalition of countries does not cooperate on emission reductions but cooperates on the development of new, climate friendly technologies that reduce the costs of abatement. The equilibrium size of such a coalition, as well as equilibrium emissions, depends on the distribution across countries of their willingness to pay for emission reductions. Increased willingness to pay for emissions reductions for any group of countries will reduce (or leave unchanged) the equilibrium coalition size. However, the effect of such an increase in aggregate willingness to pay on equilibrium emissions is ambiguous.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Technology Agreements with Heterogeneous Countries

Hoel

Zeeuw

2013

SSRN Journal

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“…In fact, a club good is a public good that is excludable and nonrivalrous, and its consumption always generates a positive utility. For example, R&D investments reduce the abatement cost also when the coalition is formed by few countries, for example, Nagashima and Dellink (). On the other hand, the SEs reflect the fact that when the coalition is small, then being a member of the IEA is a disadvantage.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The idea behind the above‐mentioned mechanisms is to counterbalance the benefits of free riding by imposing a cost on nonsignatories, for instance by imposing trade sanctions or by rewarding the countries that do join the coalition with access to exclusive IEA members' clubs, such as trade or R&D agreements. By adding benefits to its members, the idea of a club good has been shown to be successful in enlarging the participation in a climate coalition (Carraro and Siniscalco, ; Nagashima and Dellink, ). In this same positive spirit, Cabon‐Dhersin and Ramani () put forward the idea that in being an IEA member, a country becomes part of a social network , and de facto , gets extra gains, which they call social externalities (SEs).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact of social externalities on the formation of an international environmental agreement: an exploratory analysis

Sacco

Zaccour

2018

Int Trans Operational Res

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We analyze the impact of social externalities (SEs) on the stability of an international environmental agreement (IEA). We consider a framework in which players are divided into two homogeneous groups, namely, developed and developing countries. We assume that members of an IEA get some additional benefits, to which we refer as SEs. One main result is that any coalition that is internally stable will expand to include all countries, which is related to the minimum participation clause considered in some papers. However, our minimum, which is endogenously defined, is not the largest stable coalition size, but the grand coalition.

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“…5 These sub-global climate coalitions and the associated free-rider problem is important in the context of international climate change negotiations. See Nagashima and Dellink (2008). This assumption allows us to detect potential free riders by identifying nations with positive net benefits under a climate agreement.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regional variation, holdouts, and climate treaty negotiations

Holladay

Livermore

2013

J Benefit Cost Analysis

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We develop a model of international agreements to price a transboundry externality and provide a new heuristic to aid in interpreting negotiation behavior. Under conservative assumptions, a country’s net benefits will be positive under an efficient pollution price if its share of global damages is less than half its share of worldwide abatement costs. We solve for a permit allocation scheme consistent with that heuristic such that every region will have positive net benefits in an agreement to price the pollution externality at the globally efficient level. We then apply this framework to climate change using regional data from Integrated Assessment Models and test the feasibility of a global climate change treaty. The results indicate that several regions have positive net benefits from a globally efficient price on carbon, including Western Europe, South Asia (including India), and Latin America. We then solve for a permit allocation scheme that should produce worldwide agreement on a climate treaty. Using the same model, we show that differential carbon taxes aimed at producing universal agreement would produce tax rate differences of an order of magnitude. We also argue that shares of global GDP might be an appropriate proxy for exposure to climate damages and find that a global climate treaty would be cost-benefit justified for all countries without transfers when that assumption is used.

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Technology spillovers and stability of international climate coalitions

Cited by 21 publications

References 44 publications

Technology Agreements with Heterogeneous Countries

Technology Agreements with Heterogeneous Countries

Impact of social externalities on the formation of an international environmental agreement: an exploratory analysis

Regional variation, holdouts, and climate treaty negotiations

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