Terra Calling: Defending and Securing the Space Economy: From Science to Fiction and Back to Reality

Soesanto, Stefan

doi:10.3929/ethz-b-000460220

Cited by 1 publication

(1 citation statement)

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“…Then in September 2014, hackers attacked the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) satellite information and weather systems. The attack forced NOAA to take down the system and stop transmitting satellite images to the National Weather Service for two days before the organization was able to seal off the data [5,10].…”

Section: Space Cybersecuritymentioning

confidence: 99%

Identifying Space Threats for SpaceAware Resilience- a Spacecraft and Satellite Service Resilience Model

Berthoud

Agass²

2022

2022 IEEE Aerospace Conference (AERO)

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The world has become very reliant on satellites. Businesses, Governments and Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) are using space systems at an unprecedented scale. For example, timing signals from GNSS synchronise high speed financial transactions and energy networks, while communications networks rely on satellites for connectivity, broadcast infrastructure and backhauling. However, the dependence of our society on space systems means we are vulnerable to any threats to space infrastructure. Whilst governance is one of the keys to effective space security, protection and planning also play critical roles. This work focusses on planning, by modelling threats to space systems.The aim of this work was to contribute the satellite element to an application or 'app' being developed for military and civilian infrastructure managers and business leaders. The app will allow the evaluation of risk to spacecraft and to all the downstream elements of infrastructure and business processes that they service. This app is a software model called 'SpaceAware Resilience'. Previously it modelled only the downstream impact of degraded services from satellites but did not model the risk to the satellite systems themselves. The objective of this work was to add this element to the model. This included evaluating a variety of threats to satellite systems and establishing some possible threat scenarios for later demonstration purposes. This work was limited to threats to the orbiting satellite itself, as the least understood part of the infrastructure, not to the ground stations or up-or downlinks. Two types of threats were established: unintentional and intentional. Unintentional threats included space debris and space weather radiation effects on satellites and their services, intentional threats included anti-satellite weapons and cyberattacks. Risk scenarios were selected based on incidents with historical data available. This information will help the next stage of modelling likelihood and impact. It is hoped that this improved threat model will help agencies, companies and government learn more about the key vulnerabilities of space systems, the infrastructure they serve and possible mitigations. TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION .

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Section: Space Cybersecuritymentioning

confidence: 99%