The cartelization of local governments

Holcombe, Randall G.; Williams, DeEdgra W.

doi:10.1007/s11127-011-9825-8

Cited by 3 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…From the aspect of effect of local government competition First, it promotes economic growth (Grassmueck and Shields, 2010;Fu and Qiao, 2011;Fu and Zhu, 2013;Cheng, 2013); second, it causes macroeconomic fluctuation (Guo and Zhao, 2012); third, it causes repeated construction of infrastructure, "feudal economy" and local protectionism (De Paola and Scoppa, 2010;Wang, 2013;Yang et al, 2014); fourth, it leads to low efficiency of public goods supply (Holcombe and Williams, 2011;Liu, 2010). The fourth and fifth hypotheses:…”

Section: K 445mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In order to attract investment, many heavy energyconsumption enterprise and high-pollution enterprise are invited (Xiong, 2008). Because the negative influences of local government decision-making competition are far greater than its positive influences, the efficiency of public goods supply is subjected to serious threaten (Holcombe and Williams, 2011).…”

Section: K 445mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Local government public expenditure presents a distorted structure (Fu, 2007). On the one hand, local government decision-making competition leads to low efficiency of infrastructure construction and public goods supply (Holcombe and Williams, 2011). On the other hand, local government decision-making competition leads to reconstruction of infrastructure and resource waste (Wang, 2013).…”

Section: K 445mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Local government decision-making competition would have negative effect on new urbanization construction (Li, 2013). It would result in disorder of attracting investment competition, financing difficulty (Xiong, 2008); regional economic cannot achieve Pareto optimal, regional industrial structure would be convergent, economic structure would fluctuate (Guo and Zhao, 2012); market is highly fragmented, industrial structure is hardly optimized, the areal division of labor in economic production is hardly thinned, coordinated development between cities and towns are hardly achieved (Li, 2010); repeated construction of infrastructures (Wang, 2013); low efficiency of public goods supply (Holcombe and Williams, 2011;Lin, 2014); "arable land wasting" is serious (Wang, 2010). Thus, how to avoid local government decisionmaking competition and reduce the negative effect brought by local government decision-making competition have strong practical and theory guidance significance.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How to reduce local government decision-making competition in China’s new urbanization process

Wang

2015

Kybernetes

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of local government decision-making competition new urbanization, further to seek measures to weaken the negative effect of local government decision-making competition. Design/methodology/approach – This paper first puts forward the three paths which make local government decision-making competition: construction of new-style urbanization, economic development and construction of people’s livelihood and take China’s new-style urbanization as an example, the authors analyzed the internal mechanism of decision making of local government competition which caused by above three paths. Second, using the prospect theory, risk aversion theory and Cournot duopoly model, the authors analyzed how to avoid the local government decision-making competition and how to reduce the harm caused by local government decision-making competition. Findings – The central government can curb the appearance of local government competition strategy through regulating and controlling the effectiveness of local government protective-investment policy, improving the degree of market competition and punishment coefficient of government decision-making failure and further, the authors can reduce the detriment of decision-making competition between local governments through adjusting the revenue function of local government in the process of new-style urbanization. Originality/value – New-style urbanization is the main driving force of China’s future economic development, however, in the process of new-style urbanization, because of the “principle-agent” relationship between central government and local government, officials achievements appraisal mechanism and promotion game, they all cause competition between local government decision making, and this will weaken the positive effect of urbanization. Although, there are many researches on horizontal and intergovernmental competition, most researches devoted to how to avoid it from the angle of institutional economics, and the suggestions put forward by these researches are hardly applied. Anyone interested in how to avoid local government decision-making competition and reduce the negative influences of it from the angle of unitary government state’s reality will find this paper valuable.

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Section: K 445mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: K 445mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: K 445mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How to reduce local government decision-making competition in China’s new urbanization process

Wang

2015

Kybernetes

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“…7 A related literature addresses centralization's effects on prosperity. See, for instance, in this issue, Holcombe and Williams (2011) and Buser (2011), and the papers referenced in the latter, especially Feld et al (2003), Feld and Dede (2004), and Feld et al (2008). Our point here isn't that public choice scholars have ignored the benefits of centralization versus decentralization entirely.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%