The centre no longer holds: the Lega, Matteo Salvini and the remaking of Italian immigration politics

Abstract

This article asks how policy responses to migration in Italy have been shaped both by issue salience and by changing configurations on the centre right of Italian party politics both prior to and following the 2015 'migration crisis'. We show that, first, the increased politicisation of 'irregular' arrivals into Italy after 2015 changed migration from a relatively 'quiet' policy issue to one of 'loud' politics meaning that it was highly salient to the public. This salience significantly advantaged the Lega, who by this point had already transformed into an archetypal, European populist radical right party, but could now campaign successfully nationally and dominate the nominal 'centre-right' coalition. Second, the imposition when in government between June 2018 and September 2019 by the Lega of policies for migrants and asylum-seekers that focussed solely on prevention and removal and ended what remained of prior policy drift. We show that both trends conform to theoretical expectations regarding the relative power of interest groups and public opinion over public policy that are contingent on public issue salience, which we show to be the most plausible determinant of variation in migration policy, rather than public attitudes or party positions, during the period.

Understanding Right-Wing Populism and What to Do about It

“…These individuals have intermediate education levels, only moderate trust in EU institutions 1 and cultural concerns over immigration (Figure 79). The increased politicisation of the immigration issue since the 2015 migration crisis changed the salience of the issue among the public, significantly advantaging Lega, which had by that point transformed from a regional into a fully-fledged antiimmigration RWPP party (Dennison and Geddes 2021). Among Lega's electorate, a substantial proportion of voters have both cultural and economic concerns over immigration, while some have no concerns at all, suggesting the presence of multiple routes to the Lega vote (Figure 78).…”

“…In other words, the political economy of contemporary Italian politics does not reflect the realities of the country's immigrant population. While migrant workers are key to several areas of economic activity, there are no equivalent routes for regular non-EU migration (Dennison and Geddes 2021). The politicisation and increased salience of this issue has led to the simultaneous decline of the centre-right political space and rise of RWPPs.…”

Guilt by association? The criminalisation of sea rescue NGOs in Italian media

“…The framing of migration increasingly reflects new political cleavages predicated upon support or opposition to European integration, economic globalisation, and migration alike, such as those between Green, Alternative, and Liberal (GAL) and Traditional, Authoritarian, and Nationalist (TAN) parties (Hooghe and Marks 2017). Studies of migration to Italy show that maritime irregular arrivals to Italy were increasingly politicised after 2014 (Dennison and Geddes 2021;Urso 2018). Once sea rescue operations became contentious, the activities of the NGOs conducting them became increasingly politicised as well.…”

Right-wing extremism and lone-actor violence in Italy: the case of the 2018 Macerata shooting

“…He was reportedly included in the party's electoral list at the last moment to make up the numbers (Tonacci 2018a(Tonacci , 2018b; it is therefore not surprising that in the end he did not receive any preference vote. As is well known, especially since the 2015 migrant crisis, the Lega Nord has devoted much attention to the issue of irregular migration to Italy (see, among others, Dennison and Geddes 2021). In this context, the local chapter of the Lega in the Macerata area could represent an 'echo chamber' in which even radical views on irregular migrants could be tolerated (rather than inhibited or questioned).…”