2021
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-020-02950-3
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The computational philosophy: simulation as a core philosophical method

Abstract: Modeling and computer simulations, we claim, should be considered core philosophical methods. More precisely, we will defend two theses. First, philosophers should use simulations for many of the same reasons we currently use thought experiments. In fact, simulations are superior to thought experiments in achieving some philosophical goals. Second, devising and coding computational models instill good philosophical habits of mind. Throughout the paper, we respond to the often implicit objection that computer m… Show more

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Cited by 14 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…While it may turn out that such a threat is indeed relevant under specific conditions of inquiry, which exact conditions these are (when interpreted in terms of actual scientific practice) has remained largely underspecified in the literature. 20 From a more general point of view, our study provides support to recent calls for a modest treatment of results obtained by highly idealized agent-based models of scientific inquiry unless they have been empirically validated (Martini & Fernández Pinto, 2017;Frey & Šešelja, 2018;Thicke, 2020;Šešelja et al 2020;Šešelja, 2021; for a somewhat different viewpoint see Mayo-Wilson & Zollman, 2021).…”
Section: Searchsupporting
confidence: 58%
“…While it may turn out that such a threat is indeed relevant under specific conditions of inquiry, which exact conditions these are (when interpreted in terms of actual scientific practice) has remained largely underspecified in the literature. 20 From a more general point of view, our study provides support to recent calls for a modest treatment of results obtained by highly idealized agent-based models of scientific inquiry unless they have been empirically validated (Martini & Fernández Pinto, 2017;Frey & Šešelja, 2018;Thicke, 2020;Šešelja et al 2020;Šešelja, 2021; for a somewhat different viewpoint see Mayo-Wilson & Zollman, 2021).…”
Section: Searchsupporting
confidence: 58%
“…A quick gloss on the purpose of thought experiments is that they serve primarily as intuition pumps (Dennett, 1980(Dennett, , 1991(Dennett, , 2013. They may be used, for example, to elicit normative intuitions, to justify counterfactual claims (also relying on intuitions), to explore logical relationships among philosophical theses, among others (Mayo-Wilson and Zollman, 2020). As Dennett (1980) describes intuition pumps, they are typically used for provoking 'a family of intuitions by producing variations on a basic thought experiment' (429).…”
Section: Philosophical Thought Experimentsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…7). This is beautiful work, and a great example of computational philosophy in action (Mayo-Wilson and Zollman, 2021). But in what sense does this give us an explanation of the success of induction?…”
Section: The Simulations Douven (2021 2) Writesmentioning
confidence: 96%