The Conflation of Participatory Budgeting and Public–Private Partnerships in Porto Alegre, Brazil: The Construction of a Working‐Class Mall for Street Hawkers

Abstract

This article addresses the political transition of Porto Alegre's Participatory Budget from a mechanism of restraining and managing some of the harshest manifestations of neoliberal urbanization to a promoter of profit-driven urban development. The most emblematic instance of the transition is the public-private partnership for the construction and management by a developer of a marketplace to relocate downtown street hawkers to an enclosed building. The article describes not only how the mayoŕs office was able to approve, as part of the downtown revitalization project, the relocation of street hawkers into a working-class popular shopping mall but also how the executive branch succeeded in transforming a public-private partnership into an elected participatory budget demand. Furthermore, I demonstrate how neoliberal programs of public-private partnerships undermine more redistributive participatory practices, such as the participatory budget, by combining their mechanisms with the older practices rather than eliminating the rival planning tool. This article provides an analysis of local class interests and strategies regarding the issue of street hawking in Porto Alegre by contrasting models of participatory planning. I argue that social classes with an investment in the urban question are key actors in developing hybrid models of neoliberal urbanization.

Exploring elitisation of participatory budgeting in a post-Soviet democracy: evidence from a Ukrainian municipality

“…Ukraine's Soviet legacy appears to have generated rent-seeking networks of politicians, bureaucracy and oligarchs (Zimmer and Haran, 2008;Aslund, 2009Aslund, , 2015b. Such networks strive to circumvent the PB process, as has also been the case in many local administrative units of Brazil (Wampler and Avritzer, 2004;Walker, 2015Walker, , 2016L€ uchmann et al, 2018). A deputy provided the following account:…”

“…In Brazil, politicians and administrators in the municipality of Recife circumvented the PB process to prioritise project proposals based on clientelism and political patronage (Wampler and Avritzer, 2004). Similarly, the bureaucracy in Porto Alegre used the threat of eviction against stallholders to promote a shopping complex which was to be financed as a private-public partnership (Walker, 2015). As a result, the leader of the stallholders opted to promote the project through PB.…”

“…, 2016; Friendly, 2019). In particular, their socioeconomic background and networks have enabled them to challenge or bend participatory procedures to further their own interests (Célérier and Botey, 2015; Walker, 2015; Friendly, 2019). It has also been shown that, due to the involvement of multiple actors, the participatory process has become a power struggle (Kuruppu et al.…”

“…However, the majority of cases, especially relating to developing countries, have produced rather contradictory findings, as various actors have dominated the participatory decision-making process by exploiting their knowledge, capabilities and resources (Kundu, 2011;C el erier and Botey, 2015;Kuruppu et al, 2016;Friendly, 2019). In particular, their socioeconomic background and networks have enabled them to challenge or bend participatory procedures to further their own interests (C el erier and Botey, 2015;Walker, 2015;Friendly, 2019). It has also been shown that, due to the involvement of multiple actors, the participatory process has become a power struggle (Kuruppu et al, 2016;Friendly, 2019) and hence transformed into something that was not intended at its inception (Aleksandrov and Timoshenko, 2018).…”

“The Worker's Party sold out the street vendors”: Revanchist populism and the crisis of labor in Belo Horizonte, Brazil

“…Historically, the PT has played a central role in shaping Brazil’s innovative urban policy (Fernandes, 2007). Despite receiving international praise and achieving some significant advancements, Brazil's urban reform has failed to extend rights to informal street vendors, and legal frameworks often restrict their access to public spaces for their livelihoods (Nogueira and Shin, 2022; Pimentel Walker, 2015). In the context of the 2018 elections, this paper will investigate the role of restrictive local urban policies in stimulating support for Bolsonaro among street vendors in Belo Horizonte.…”