The dynamics of responder behavior in ultimatum games: a meta-study

Abstract

Using data aggregated from seven papers that study repeated play in standard ultimatum games with either stranger or absolute stranger matching, we show that the behavior of responders changes with experience. High offers are more likely to be accepted with experience and low offers are more likely to be rejected. At the individual level, there is a negative relationship between the likelihood that a given offer is accepted and the size of the preceding offer. We compare the results with predictions generated by static models of distributional preferences, implicitly dynamic models of preferences with reciprocity, and explicitly dynamic models of adaptive learning. The data is most consistent with models of preferences with reciprocity.

Social norms or social preferences?

“…7 I do not know of experiments on the Ultimatum Game in which subjects have experience of more than ten trials, which is not a large number. Cooper and Dutcher (2009) nevertheless find evidence of change in the responders' behavior over time, but the behavioralists are right that there is not a lot of movement overall.…”

Bargaining in the Absence of Property Rights: An Experiment

“…The maximal amount that h would be willing to pay, to purchase the good from l, is affected by h's preferences for fairness. As an entire literature on ultimatum games has demonstrated, offers deemed grossly unfair are often rejected (Güth, Schmittberger et al 1982, Oosterbeek, Sloof et al 2004, Hoffman, McCabe et al 2008, Cooper and Dutcher 2011. This in particular holds for offers that leave the responder less than half of the surplus (Hoffman and Spitzer 1982, Prudencio 1982, Harrison and McKee 1985, Shogren 1992.…”

“…This side, the proposer, makes a take-itor-leave-it offer to the other side, the responder. In the experimental literature, such negotiations are known as ultimatum games (Güth, Schmittberger et al 1982, Cooper andDutcher 2011). If the responder is likely to reject offers she considers (grossly) unfair, the proposer faces strategic uncertainty.…”

An Experimental Investigation of Auctions and Bargaining in Procurement

“…A seller's strategy is to exit the auction when her costs exceeds the auction price, and accept any subsequent profitable ultimatum offer. This opposes what is observed in ultimatum game experiments where responders commonly reject profitable offers that are less than equitable even when experienced (Cooper and Dutcher, 2011), or there is incomplete information about the amount 1 of potential gains from exchange (Croson, 1996;Harstad and Nagel, 2004).…”