2015
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2015.04.024
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The effect of credit guarantees on credit availability and delinquency rates

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Cited by 64 publications
(31 citation statements)
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“…Furthermore, such a principle also implemented in the matter of credit application requirement, maximum credit limit, and the settlement of the non-performing loan. Lubis & Rachmina (2011), Pato (2013, Boschi et al, (2017), and Cowan et al, (2015) mentioned that collateral value even becomes an important consideration when deciding on credit approval. For banks, collateral value will reduce the default risk from debtors, because banks can sell their assets to cover the bad debts.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Furthermore, such a principle also implemented in the matter of credit application requirement, maximum credit limit, and the settlement of the non-performing loan. Lubis & Rachmina (2011), Pato (2013, Boschi et al, (2017), and Cowan et al, (2015) mentioned that collateral value even becomes an important consideration when deciding on credit approval. For banks, collateral value will reduce the default risk from debtors, because banks can sell their assets to cover the bad debts.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This arises due to the comfort provided by the DFI intervention, whereby the borrower no longer has to provide personal guarantees (Lelarge et al 2010). This may also result in a situation where borrowers are less likely to repay their guaranteed credits (Cowan et al 2012). One response to these findings, now quite commonly adopted by DFIs issuing partial credit guarantees, is to reduce moral hazard by prohibiting participating banks from informing their borrowers as to whether their loans are counterguaranteed or not.…”
Section: Use Of Statistical Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Cowan et al (2015) argue that the chance of the loans of companies participating in a guarantee scheme becoming non-performing in the first 24 months is 1.67 per cent higher than that of those who do not have a guarantee, although the authors admit that credit guarantees do facilitate SME financing.…”
Section: Studies áDám Balogmentioning
confidence: 99%