2012
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2144343
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The Effect of Credit Guarantees on Credit Availability and Delinquency Rates

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Cited by 2 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Using firm‐level data from the UK, Cowling (2010) compares the capital constraints faced by smaller firms with and without an available guarantee scheme and finds support for the notion that programs which provide loan security relax the financial constraint for small businesses. Similar positive effects of opening up credit access for SMEs are also found in other OECD countries, including Italy (Zecchini and Ventura, 2009), Canada (Riding et al ., 2007), Korea (Kang & Heshmati, 2008), Spain (Garcia‐Tabuenca & Crespo‐Espert, 2010), France (Lelarge et al ., 2010) and Chile (Cowan et al ., 2015).…”
Section: A Policy Viewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Using firm‐level data from the UK, Cowling (2010) compares the capital constraints faced by smaller firms with and without an available guarantee scheme and finds support for the notion that programs which provide loan security relax the financial constraint for small businesses. Similar positive effects of opening up credit access for SMEs are also found in other OECD countries, including Italy (Zecchini and Ventura, 2009), Canada (Riding et al ., 2007), Korea (Kang & Heshmati, 2008), Spain (Garcia‐Tabuenca & Crespo‐Espert, 2010), France (Lelarge et al ., 2010) and Chile (Cowan et al ., 2015).…”
Section: A Policy Viewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There have been few rigorous impact assessments of partial credit guarantees, though the few that have been undertaken point to a somewhat positive effect, as that by Lelarge, Sraer, and Thesmar (2010) in the case of the French credit guarantee scheme. Two separate studies suggest that the Chilean scheme FOGAPE has generated additional loans for new and existing bank clients and that the additional loans have led to higher sales and profit growth (Cowan, Drexler, and Yañez, 2008; Larrain and Quiroz, 2006). However, another study questions the additionality effect as approximately 80 per cent of the firms that benefit from the guarantees have had bank loans in the past (Benavente, Galetovic, and Sanhueza, 2006).…”
Section: Differentiating Between Different Policy Levers – the Access Possibilities Frontiermentioning
confidence: 99%