The Effect of Political Alignment on Transfers to Portuguese Municipalities

Migueis, Marco

doi:10.1111/ecpo.12005

Cited by 75 publications

(53 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…The same logic has since been employed to estimate the effect of incumbency in other settings and on other outcomes of interest (e.g., Boas and Hidalgo, 2011;Broockman, 2009;Butler, 2009;Dal Bo et al, 2009;Eggers and Hainmueller, 2009;Folke and Snyder, 2012;Hainmueller and Kern, 2008;Lee et al, 2004;Migueis, 2013;Querubin and Snyder, 2013;Titiunik, 2012;Uppal, 2009Uppal, , 2010. The RD design depends on an important assumption concerning potential outcomes.…”

Section: The Rd Estimator: a Combination Of The Personal And Partisanmentioning

confidence: 99%

Disentangling the Personal and Partisan Incumbency Advantages: Evidence from Close Elections and Term Limits

Fowler

Hall

2014

QJPS

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Although the scholarly literature on incumbency advantages focuses on personal advantages, the partisan incumbency advantage -the electoral benefit accruing to non-incumbent candidates by virtue of being from the incumbent party -is also an important electoral factor. Understanding this phenomenon is important for evaluating the role of parties vs. individuals in U.S. elections and the incentives of incumbents and their parties in the legislature, among other things. In this paper, we define the partisan incumbency advantage, explain its possible role in elections, and show how it confounds previous estimates of the personal incumbency advantage. We then exploit close elections in conjunction with term limits in U.S. state legislatures to separately estimate the personal and partisan incumbency advantages. The personal advantage is perhaps larger than previously thought, and the partisan advantage is indistinguishable from zero and possibly negative. * We thank Steve Ansolabehere and Jim Snyder for sharing data and providing helpful comments and support. We also thank

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Section: The Rd Estimator: a Combination Of The Personal And Partisanmentioning

confidence: 99%

Disentangling the Personal and Partisan Incumbency Advantages: Evidence from Close Elections and Term Limits

Fowler

Hall

2014

QJPS

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“…At an even more local level of scrutiny, Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) also finds left governments in Swedish municipalities to be characterized by higher taxes and spending than their right counterparts. Migueis (2010), using regression discontinuity design, finds a number of significant differences between left and right governments among Portuguese municipalities. On the one hand, left governments are found to be more likely to adopt corporate taxes and to spend on social infrastructure.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Ideology and Taxation in Latin America

Stein

Caro²

2013

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent. Terms of use: Documents inThe unauthorized commercial use of Bank documents is prohibited and may be punishable under the Bank's policies and/or applicable laws.Copyright © Inter-American Development Bank. This working paper may be reproduced for any non-commercial purpose. It may also be reproduced in any academic journal indexed by the American Economic Association's EconLit, with previous consent by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication. This paper examines the impact of ideology on tax revenues in Latin America, using a panel of 17 countries from 1990 to 2010. As a first approach, a fixedeffects model is used to identify the impact of ideology on taxation; left-leaning governments are associated with increases in total tax revenues and income tax revenues of 2.1 and 1.3 percent of GDP, respectively. There is no effect on revenues from VAT or social security taxes. To deal with endogeneity problems, an event study and a difference in difference methodology are used to track the behavior of revenues around the time of the shifts to the left. Tax revenues and income tax revenues increase by 1.5 and 0.8 percent of GDP when comparing revenues immediately before and after the shift in ideology. The pattern of tax revenues around ideological shifts suggests that the effects are causal. Cataloging-in-Publication JEL classifications: H20, P16

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“…4 The advantage of this design is that it overcomes a fundamental identification problem-the potential correlation between fiscal choices and the ideological characteristics of its voters-to identify the alignment effect on tax setting, grant allocation and public spending. A similar approach, in the context of grant allocation only, has been used in independent works by Brollo and Nannicini (2012) and Migueis (2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…ical alignment with the center generates higher levels of discretionary grant to the local government, for example, Levitt and Snyder (1995) and Larcinese et al (2006), for the US, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) for Spain, Arulampalam et al (2009) for India, Case (2001) for Albania, Rodden and Wilkinson (2004) for India, Brollo and Nannicini (2012) for Brazil, and Migueis (2013) for Portugal. In particular, our theoretical finding that alignment effects are stronger in election years is consistent with Brollo and Nannicini (2012).…”

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confidence: 99%

Intergovernmental grants as signals and the alignment effect: Theory and evidence

Bracco

Lockwood

Porcelli

et al. 2015

Journal of Public Economics

142

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This paper provides a simple political agency model to explain the effect of political alignment between different tiers of government on intergovernmental grants and election outcomes. Key features of the model are: (i) rational voters interpret public good provision as a signal of incumbent competence, and (ii) realistically, grants are unobservable to voters. In this setting, the national government will use the grant as an instrument to manipulate the public good signal for the benefit of aligned local incumbents and challengers. Then, aligned municipalities receive more grants, with this effect being stronger before elections, and the probability that the aligned local incumbent is re-elected is higher. These predictions are tested using a regression discontinuity design on a new data-set on Italian municipalities. At a second empirical stage, the national grant to municipalities is instrumented with an alignment indicator, allowing estimation of a flypaper effect for Italian municipalities. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Code: H200, H770, H87, D700.

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The Effect of Political Alignment on Transfers to Portuguese Municipalities

Cited by 75 publications

References 19 publications

Disentangling the Personal and Partisan Incumbency Advantages: Evidence from Close Elections and Term Limits

Disentangling the Personal and Partisan Incumbency Advantages: Evidence from Close Elections and Term Limits

Ideology and Taxation in Latin America

Intergovernmental grants as signals and the alignment effect: Theory and evidence

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