2021
DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12178
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The effects of foreign aid on rebel governance: Evidence from a large‐scale US aid program in Syria

Abstract: Existing research generally finds that foreign aid is ineffective in bolstering perceptions of governance, especially in conflict‐affected countries. Yet while most studies have focused on aid provided to state actors, this paper examines the link between aid and popular support for governing institutions in rebel‐held territory. We argue that aid can improve opinions of these institutions when they are embedded in the demographic, aspirational, and experiential solidarities of their communities. To evaluate o… Show more

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Cited by 5 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“… 3 For a review of the causes of political instability, see Slater (2013); and for a review of the consequences and causes of democratic backsliding, see Lust and Waldner (2015). International factors may also matter (Carnegie, Clark, and Zucker 2021), such as countries' dependence on the United States, receipt of foreign aid (Carnegie et al 2022; Muller 1985), or membership in international organizations (Poast and Urpelainen 2015). …”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“… 3 For a review of the causes of political instability, see Slater (2013); and for a review of the consequences and causes of democratic backsliding, see Lust and Waldner (2015). International factors may also matter (Carnegie, Clark, and Zucker 2021), such as countries' dependence on the United States, receipt of foreign aid (Carnegie et al 2022; Muller 1985), or membership in international organizations (Poast and Urpelainen 2015). …”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“… 6 Though see Carnegie et al (2021a). On the limits of the ‘hearts and minds’ approach to counterinsurgency more generally, see Hazelton (2017).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%