The efference cascade, consciousness, and its self: naturalizing the first person pivot of action control

Merker, Bjørn

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00501

Cited by 74 publications

(111 citation statements)

References 282 publications

(367 reference statements)

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“…This is not to say that the cortex is unimportant for conscious experience, of course. Rather, the proposal is that subcortical structures support the basic capacity for experience, the detailed contents of which might be elaborated by or otherwise depend upon cortical structures (32).…”

Section: Subjective Experience and The Vertebrate Midbrainmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For humans at least, this spatial "model" is further enhanced by processing within the subcortical dorsal pulvinar (one of the thalamic nuclei, part of the basal ganglia) (32), which adds color, three-dimensionality, and an egocentric first-person perspective to the human conscious experience of space. A major benefit of this integrated spatial simulation is that it allows animals to interact with objects in a qualitatively different set of ways than simple stimulus-bound organisms could manage.…”

Section: How the Vertebrate Midbrain Supports The Capacity For Subjecmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The contents of subjective experience will vary enormously between species, and that variation will depend in part on the degree of elaboration of cortical structures. However, the capacity for subjective experience is not dependent on containing any particular contents (9,32). The basic capacity for subjective experience that the midbrain supports is rather a capacity to have any subjective contents at all.…”

Section: How the Vertebrate Midbrain Supports The Capacity For Subjecmentioning

confidence: 99%

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What insects can tell us about the origins of consciousness

Barron

Klein

2016

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

263

183

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How, why, and when consciousness evolved remain hotly debated topics. Addressing these issues requires considering the distribution of consciousness across the animal phylogenetic tree. Here we propose that at least one invertebrate clade, the insects, has a capacity for the most basic aspect of consciousness: subjective experience. In vertebrates the capacity for subjective experience is supported by integrated structures in the midbrain that create a neural simulation of the state of the mobile animal in space. This integrated and egocentric representation of the world from the animal's perspective is sufficient for subjective experience. Structures in the insect brain perform analogous functions. Therefore, we argue the insect brain also supports a capacity for subjective experience. In both vertebrates and insects this form of behavioral control system evolved as an efficient solution to basic problems of sensory reafference and true navigation. The brain structures that support subjective experience in vertebrates and insects are very different from each other, but in both cases they are basal to each clade. Hence we propose the origins of subjective experience can be traced to the Cambrian. subjective experience | primary consciousness | vertebrate midbrain | central complex

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Section: Subjective Experience and The Vertebrate Midbrainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: How the Vertebrate Midbrain Supports The Capacity For Subjecmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: How the Vertebrate Midbrain Supports The Capacity For Subjecmentioning

confidence: 99%

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What insects can tell us about the origins of consciousness

Barron

Klein

2016

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

263

183

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“…In further elaborating the centrencephalic theory of consciousness of Penfield & Jasper [94], he proposes that primary consciousness resides in the CBS of the midbrain comprising the superior colliculus at the roof representing sensory states, the hypothalamus at the floor conveying states of the agent and the intermediate structure, zona incerta, being a conduit for their interaction and action generation via the periaqueductal grey [31]. Indeed, the zona incerta has also been implicated in deficits of consciousness such as epilepsy.…”

Section: (A) the Neuronal Substrate Of Consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Synthetic consciousness: the distributed adaptive control perspective

Verschure

2016

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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One contribution of 13 to a theme issue 'The major synthetic evolutionary transitions'. Understanding the nature of consciousness is one of the grand outstanding scientific challenges. The fundamental methodological problem is how phenomenal first person experience can be accounted for in a third person verifiable form, while the conceptual challenge is to both define its function and physical realization. The distributed adaptive control theory of consciousness (DACtoc) proposes answers to these three challenges. The methodological challenge is answered relative to the hard problem and DACtoc proposes that it can be addressed using a convergent synthetic methodology using the analysis of synthetic biologically grounded agents, or quale parsing. DACtoc hypothesizes that consciousness in both its primary and secondary forms serves the ability to deal with the hidden states of the world and emerged during the Cambrian period, affording stable multi-agent environments to emerge. The process of consciousness is an autonomous virtualization memory, which serializes and unifies the parallel and subconscious simulations of the hidden states of the world that are largely due to other agents and the self with the objective to extract norms. These norms are in turn projected as value onto the parallel simulation and control systems that are driving action. This functional hypothesis is mapped onto the brainstem, midbrain and the thalamo-cortical and cortico-cortical systems and analysed with respect to our understanding of deficits of consciousness. Subsequently, some of the implications and predictions of DACtoc are outlined, in particular, the prediction that normative bootstrapping of conscious agents is predicated on an intentionality prior. In the view advanced here, human consciousness constitutes the ultimate evolutionary transition by allowing agents to become autonomous with respect to their evolutionary priors leading to a post-biological Anthropocene.This article is part of the themed issue 'The major synthetic evolutionary transitions'.

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“…They include mostly phylogenetically ancient brain regions such as the centromedial regions gathered under the name periaqueductal gray (Bailey and Davis, 1942;Panksepp, 1998 a, b). That last structure is of fundamental importance for the emotional-motor integration as it coordinates a large variety of emotion-related behaviours, such as defence, aggression, reproduction, voice, and pains, from fish to human beings (Parvizi and Damasio,2001;Merker, , 2013Panksepp and Northoff, 2009; The present document has been produced and adopted by the bodies identified above as author(s). This task has been carried out exclusively by the author(s) in the context of a contract between the European Food Safety Authority and the author(s), awarded following a tender procedure.…”

Section: Another Approach Of Consciousness In Animalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Animal Consciousness

Neindre¹,

Bernard

Boissy

et al. 2017

EFSA Supporting Publications

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After reviewing the literature on current knowledge about consciousness in humans, we present a state-of-the art discussion on consciousness and related key concepts in animals. Obviously much fewer publications are available on non-human species than on humans, most of them relating to laboratory or wild animal species, and only few to livestock species. Human consciousness is by definition subjective and private. Animal consciousness is usually assessed through behavioural performance. Behaviour involves a wide array of cognitive processes that have to be assessed separately using specific experimental protocols. Accordingly, several processes indicative of the presence of consciousness are discussed: perception and cognition, awareness of the bodily-self, selfrelated knowledge of the environment (including social environment). When available, specific examples are given in livestock species. Next, we review the existing evidence regarding neuronal correlates of consciousness, and emphasize the difficulty of linking aspects of consciousness to specific neural structures across the phyla because high-level cognitive abilities may have evolved independently along evolution. Several mammalian brain structures (cortex and midbrain) are involved in the manifestations of consciousness, while the equivalent functional structures for birds and fishes would likely be the pallium/tectum and midbrain. Caution is required before excluding consciousness in species not having the same brain structures as the mammalian ones as different neural architectures may mediate comparable processes. Finally, specific neurophysiological mechanisms appear to be strongly linked to the emergence of consciousness, namely neural synchrony and neural feedback. Considering the limited amount of data available and the few animal species studied so far, we conclude that different manifestations of consciousness can be observed in animals but that further refinement is still needed to characterize their level and content in each species. Further research is required to clarify these issues, especially in livestock species.

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The efference cascade, consciousness, and its self: naturalizing the first person pivot of action control

Cited by 74 publications

References 282 publications

What insects can tell us about the origins of consciousness

What insects can tell us about the origins of consciousness

Synthetic consciousness: the distributed adaptive control perspective

Animal Consciousness

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