The EU's Open Strategic Autonomy from a Central Banking Perspective. Challenges to the Monetary Policy Landscape from a Changing Geopolitical Environment

Ioannou, Demosthenes; Pérez, Javier J.; Geeroms, Hans; Vansteenkiste, Isabel; Weber, Pierre-François; Almeida, Ana Maria de; Balteanu, Irina; Kataryniuk, Iván; Attinasi, Maria Grazia; Buysse, Kristel; Campos, Rodolfo G.; Clancy, Daragh; Essers, Dennis; Faccia, Donata; Freier, Maximilian; Gerinovics, Rinalds; Khalil, Makram; Kosterink, Patrick; Mancini, Michele; Manrique, Marta; McQuade, Peter; Molitor, Philippe; Pulst, Daniela; Timini, Jacopo; Schaik, Ilona Van; Valenta, Vilém; Caffarelli, Filippo Vergara; Viani, Francesca; Viilmann, Natalja; Alonso, Daniel; Bencivelli, Lorenzo; Borgogno, Oscar; Borrallo, Fructuoso; Sáez, Lucía Cuadro; Stefano, Enrica Di; Esser, Andreas; García-Lecuona, María; Habib, Maurizio Michael; Jeudy, Bruno-Philippe; Lájer, Andrés; Gallo, Florian Le; Martonosi, Ádám; Millaruelo, Antonio; Miola, Andrea; Négrin, Pauline; Zangrandi, Michele Savini; Strobel, Felix; Tylko-Tylczynska, Kalina Paula

doi:10.2139/ssrn.4402478

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…The ECB not only links its rhetoric about European autonomy to the communication of the European Commission. An extensive, but independent report by the International Relations Committee work stream that is staffed by the European System of Central Banks -56 authors from various European central banks -analysis the 'EU's Open Strategic Autonomy from a central banking perspective (Ioannou et al, 2023). While the report does not officially represent the views of the ECB or the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), its findings are nevertheless noticeable:…”

Section: The Geopolitization Of Central Banks?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Digital Euro: A Materialization of (In)Security.

Westermeier

2024

Preprint

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The European Central Bank (ECB) has entered the preparation phase for the potential issuance of a digital euro. The digital euro under consideration represents a retail Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC), a digital representation of central bank money that is intended for use by the general public. This article foregrounds the digital euro as an infrastructure that furthers European security ambitions. It argues that the development of the digital euro is a materialization of European (in)security rationales that aim to secure pan-European financial transactions amid growing geopolitical tensions. It focuses on the development of the technology and analyses how central bankers’ scenarios of the future manifest in the anticipated design and prototypes. While the provision of a financial infrastructure is the most decisive security-related implication of the digital euro, the introduction of a new form of public money is the decisive financial feature with potentially wide-ranging implications for banks. Although the ECB seeks to balance the interests of banks and other financial actors in the development of the digital euro, its plans are still met with criticism. Finally, the paper argues that the European Central Bank exerts itself more explicitly than before as geopolitical actors in its own regard.

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Section: The Geopolitization Of Central Banks?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Digital Euro: A Materialization of (In)Security.

Westermeier

2024

Preprint

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“…Dependency on third-country energy imports could, in principle, constitute a source of vulnerability for the EU and Spain. This vulnerability can be quantified using the three dependency indicators proposed by the European Commission (2021) and Ioannou and Pérez (2023). For each energy product, these indicators can be used to measure how concentrated their imports are (calculated, based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, as the sum of the squared market shares of all suppliers), their scarcity within the EU (proxied using the ratio of imports from outside the EU to total imports, both internal and external), and the extent to which they can be substituted (in other words, the ability to substitute external imports with European exports).…”

Section: Energy Dependency and Vulnerability In The Eu And Spainmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…6 Once calculated, the 6 The substitutability indicator is calculated as the ratio of non-EU imports to the region's total (internal and external) exports. For further details on how the indicators are calculated, see European Commission (2021) and Ioannou and Pérez (2023). The indicators are calculated using the trade flows included in the Eurostat NRG database for the products available and, for all other products, drawing on BACI-CEPII data in the case of the EU and Comext-Eurostat data in the case of Spain.…”

Section: Energy Dependency and Vulnerability In The Eu And Spainmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The energy dependency of the EU and Spain

Balteanu

Viani

2023

Economic Bulletin

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Rationale In recent decades, the European Union and Spain have become increasingly dependent on energy imports from third countries. Given how important these products are in production chains, this dependency could represent a source of vulnerability for the European economies. Takeaways •The energy products imported from third countries that are most vulnerable to international trade disruptions notably include natural gas, uranium, anthracite, oil and coal, all of which are in short supply within the European Union (EU), hard to substitute and, in general, concentrated in a few suppliers. •The main EU countries differ in terms of the extent of their external dependency, the energy suppliers they use and the vulnerability of their exposures. Spain is more reliant on third countries, although its imports are more diversified across different suppliers. •The patterns of the EU’s external energy dependency have been altered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, owing to the substantial reduction in European imports of energy products from Russia, which is no longer the region’s main energy supplier.

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No Longer Neutral: The ECB’s Geopoliticization of the International Role of the Euro

Spielberger

2024

PaG

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While the euro has, since its creation, been the world’s second most important currency, the ECB has long depoliticized the international role of the euro by proclaiming a neutral stance. However, as this article explains, since 2019, the ECB has embraced currency internationalization and framed the issue in geopolitical terms. This policy change reflects a response to a changed international political environment after 2018 and it has led the ECB to seek closer political coordination regarding external economic policy. As the international role of the euro has become a concern for the EU’s broader geoeconomic turn, it may, however, become difficult for the ECB to reconcile its political independence with its more geopolitical view of currency internationalization.

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The EU's Open Strategic Autonomy from a Central Banking Perspective. Challenges to the Monetary Policy Landscape from a Changing Geopolitical Environment

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

The Digital Euro: A Materialization of (In)Security.

The Digital Euro: A Materialization of (In)Security.

The energy dependency of the EU and Spain

No Longer Neutral: The ECB’s Geopoliticization of the International Role of the Euro

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