The evolution of business – state interaction in Russia: From state capture to business capture?

Yakovlev, Andrei

doi:10.1080/09668130600926256

Cited by 162 publications

(104 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…While the indicators and also the actual relevance of the results may be discussed, the typology is remarkable ( Table 2). Patronage and captured states corroborate with the concept of state and business capture (Yakovlev 2006). The typology can also be used in the explanation of recent changes of polity-business relationships in Poland and Hungary.…”

Section: Privatisation and State Asset Management In Cee Transition Pmentioning

confidence: 65%

The Reversal of the Privatisation Logic in Central European Transition Economies

Szanyi

2016

Acta Oeconomica

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The main ambition of this study is to explain the unexpected change in the transition process of some Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries starting in the second half of the 2000s. Special attention is paid to changes in and the attitudes of governments toward state ownership. Although statist approaches gained momentum in the economic policy of various states in and after the 2008/2009 crisis, this did not mean a fundamental reorientation expressed in changes in the main economic conditions such as ownership patterns. Nevertheless, governments in some CEE countries seem to flirt with such ideas too in the general policy of increasing state economic intervention. The privatisation process was stopped and in a number of cases, formerly privatised assets were re-nationalised. Governments strengthened their influence in the governance structure in mixed-ownership companies. The main body of the present paper provides a better understanding of this change in state property policies. We also call attention to the risks of a reversal of the privatisation logic. An increasing role of the state as proprietor may today strengthen similar negative political and economic consequences and risks as the ones against which the privatisation agenda of the 1990s was suggested. It can reduce competition, give way for political and personal rentseeking, and weaken the functions of market economic institutions.

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Section: Privatisation and State Asset Management In Cee Transition Pmentioning

confidence: 65%

The Reversal of the Privatisation Logic in Central European Transition Economies

Szanyi

2016

Acta Oeconomica

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“…It was elites who initiated the dissolution of the Soviet Union and who built the political order of post-Soviet Russia. In the absence of free elections, strong political institutions and independence of business activities from political interference, elites trade their power in exchange for resources (Yakovlev, 2006). This neopatrimonial system, in which the distribution of resources in exchange for the loyalty of the elites is common (Yakovlev, 2014), exacerbates event seizure.…”

Section: Event Seizure: Three Dimensionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How mega-events capture their hosts: event seizure and the World Cup 2018 in Russia

Müller

2015

Urban Geography

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This paper develops the notion of "event seizure" to better understand how mega-events, and the elites associated with them, take possession of host cities and societies-of development plans, funds and legislation-and impose their priorities on cities and citizens. It illustrates how event seizure plays out in the preparations for the Football World Cup 2018 in Russia, which is on course to become the most expensive World Cup ever with a total cost of about USD 20 billion. Drawing on government and FIFA documents, public statements from authorities and officials, and media coverage, the paper examines three different dimensions of event seizure. First, infrastructural seizure, where event-related infrastructure, particularly sports venues, crowd out infrastructure that serves wider urban needs. Second, financial seizure, where a close circle of political and business elites benefits from state funding, while the public underwrites cost overruns. Third and last, legal seizure, where the event introduces exceptional legislation, infringing citizen rights and compromising due oversight of event preparations.

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“…Former politicians could thus make state property their own in a jumbled environment 2 (e.g. Barnes, 2003;Yakovlev, 2006;Kryshtanovskaya and White, 2005). Many deals followed the 'loans-for-shares' scheme in which selected investors received underpriced state assets in return for loans to the debt-ridden government (see e.g.…”

Section: The Emergence Of Russian Oligarchsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As of 2003, given a comparably high profitability and efficiency of the 1 The relationship of political establishment and business class in Russia in the first decade after the Fall of Communism is well covered in academic literature. On the relation of politics and business in Russia see for example Schröder (1999), Kryshtanovskaya and White (2005), Yakovlev (2006), Orttung (2004) and Sidorov et al (2000). oligarchic firms, Russia is likely to be in the early, growing phase that Acemoglu describes in his model.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Income inequality and oligarchs in Russian regions: A note

Fidrmuc

Gundacker

2017

European Journal of Political Economy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We trace the rise of the so called oligarchs in post-Soviet Russia and examine their relationship to income distribution in Russia. When Russia moved to a market economy in the 1990s a new business elite evolved. Russia's distinctive path towards market economy, among other factors, gave rise to the oligarchs who now control large parts of the economy and have a strong standing within politics and society. Using a unique regional data set on the locations of oligarchs' businesses across the Russian regions, we test Acemoglu's (2008) proposition that oligarchic societies experience extreme income inequality. Our results show significantly higher levels of income inequality in regions with a higher presence of oligarchs. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Codes: L220, D430, P250, P310.

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The evolution of business – state interaction in Russia: From state capture to business capture?

Cited by 162 publications

References 12 publications

The Reversal of the Privatisation Logic in Central European Transition Economies

The Reversal of the Privatisation Logic in Central European Transition Economies

How mega-events capture their hosts: event seizure and the World Cup 2018 in Russia

Income inequality and oligarchs in Russian regions: A note

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