The evolution of sectarianism

Ille, Sebastian

doi:10.1016/j.cnsns.2021.105726

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 27 publications

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“…Our results then imply that collective memories are particularly frequently invoked in times of severe ethnic and sectarian conflict. Salloukh (2019), for example, shows that the various sectarian leaders used war memories during the Lebanese Civil War to increase tensions between groups and foster their own political and economic benefits (see also Ille 2021, for a further discussion and theoretical results). Our results further imply that harshness of conflict and sampling/use of past collective memory are self-reinforcing as one leads to the other.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Memory retrieval and harshness of conflict in the hawk–dove game

et al. 2022

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We study the long-run dynamics of a repeated non-symmetric hawk–dove type interaction between agents of two different populations. Agents choose a strategy based on their previous experience with the other population by sampling from a collective memory of past interactions. We assume that the sample size differs between populations and define a measure of harshness of conflict in the hawk–dove interaction. We then show how the properties of the long-run equilibrium depend on the harshness of conflict and the relative length of the sample. In symmetric interactions, if conflict is harsh, the population which samples relatively more past interactions is able to appropriate a higher payoff in the long-run, while the population with a relatively smaller sample does so if conflict is mild. These results hold subject to constraints on the sample size which we discuss in detail. We further extend our results to non-symmetric hawk–dove games.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Memory retrieval and harshness of conflict in the hawk–dove game

et al. 2022

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Mass Atrocities and Their Prevention

Anderton

Bräuer

2021

Journal of Economic Literature

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Counting conservatively, data show about 100 million mass atrocity-related deaths since 1900. A distinct empirical phenomenon, mass atrocities are events of enormous scale, severity, and brutality, occur in wartime and in peacetime, are geographically widespread, occur with surprising frequency, under various systems of governance, and can be long-lasting in their effects on economic and human development, wellbeing, and wealth, more so when nonfatal physical injuries and mental trauma also are considered. As such, mass atrocities are a major economic concern. Given the multidisciplinary nature of the subject matter, the pertinent conceptual, theoretical, and empirical literatures are voluminous and widely dispersed, and have not been synthesized before from an economics point of view. We address two gaps: a “mass atrocities gap” in the economics literature and an “economics gap” in mass atrocities scholarship. Our goals are, first, to survey and synthesize for economists a broad sweep of literatures on which to base further work in this field and, second, for both economists and noneconomists to learn how economic inquiry contributes to understanding the causes and conduct of mass atrocities and, possibly, to their mitigation and prevention. In drawing on standard, behavioral, identity, social network, and complex systems economics, we find that the big puzzles of the “how” and “why” of mass atrocities, and mass participation therein, are being well addressed. While new research on such topics will be valuable, work should also progress to develop improved prevention approaches. (JEL D72, D74, K38, N40, Z13)

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Macrodynamic Modeling of Innovation Equilibria and Traps

Carrera

Ille

Travaglini

2021

The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics

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We study the interplay between the decision of firms to innovate and human capital. Based on a dynamic evolutionary model, we show that in the presence of a high stock of human capital, an advanced economy can remain caught in an “innovation trap”. Following the literature on endogenous growth, R&D investments and human capital are modeled as strategic complements. Skilled workers increase productivity and enjoy a wage premium if they are employed in the R&D sector, while they receive the same wage as unskilled workers if they are employed in the production sector. We model the evolutionary dynamics of the share of innovative firms and human capital to determine the conditions under which an economy converges to a high, low or mixed state of innovation.

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The evolution of sectarianism

Cited by 3 publications

References 27 publications

Memory retrieval and harshness of conflict in the hawk–dove game

Memory retrieval and harshness of conflict in the hawk–dove game

Mass Atrocities and Their Prevention

Macrodynamic Modeling of Innovation Equilibria and Traps

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