The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships

Abstract

Why do some dictatorships establish institutions that may constrain their leaders? We argue that institutions promote the survival of dictatorships by facilitating authoritarian power-sharing. Specifically, institutions such as parties, legislatures, and advisory councils alleviate commitment and monitoring problems between the dictator and his allies caused by the secrecy in authoritarian governance. However, because authoritarian power-sharing succeeds only when it is backed by a credible threat of a rebellion by the dictator's allies, institutions will be ineffective or break down when an imbalance of power within the ruling coalition undermines this threat's credibility. Our arguments clarify the complex interaction between collective action, commitment, and monitoring problems in authoritarian governance. We use both historical and large-N data to assess new empirical predictions about the relationship between political institutions, leader survival, and the concentration of power in dictatorships.

Party Strength and Economic Growth

“…Meanwhile, a distinct literature on autocratic regimes finds that institutionalized parties help to stabilize authoritarian rule (Boix & Svolik 2013;Brownlee 2009;Greene 2007;Huntington 1968;Magaloni 2006Magaloni , 2008Magaloni & Kricheli 2010;Svolik 2012). Researchers have also noted that one-party regimes are associated with greater investment and stronger growth performance than other types of autocracies (Gandhi 2008;Gehlbach & Keefer 2011;Keefer 2007;Miller 2015;Wright 2008), though problems of causal identification persist (Pepinsky 2014).…”

“…In particular, cohesion among elites is enhanced, allowing party leaders to resolve coordination problems among themselves -striking deals that involve intertemporal tradeoffs and enforcing those deals through time (Boix & Svolik 2013;Hicken & Simmons 2008;Kuhonta 2011;Magaloni 2006;McGillivray 1997;Müller 2000;Nielson 2003;Svolik 2012;Tommasi 2006). Focusing on democratic settings, Gerring & Thacker (2008: 36-37) propose that "wherever parties are weak, policies are necessarily the product of ad hoc coalitions and individual interests," whereas a strong party "synchronizes individual career goals with the party's quest for political power."…”

Cues to Coup Plotters

“…Finally, relating coups more closely to the literature on institutions under authoritarianism, Rød (2012) finds evidence that the presence of nominally democratic institutions lowers the probability of coup attempts in line with the arguments and evidence presented in Gandhi (2008), Gandhi andPrzeworski (2006, 2007), and Boix and Svolik (2013). In spite of these studies, relatively little has been done to investigate the determinants of coups within the specific context of autocracies with institutions.…”

“…These incentives involve greater influence, possibilities for promotions, and a share of the spoils of government. Such co-optation can either be targeted at the opposition and the public who can threaten with a revolt (e.g., Gandhi and Przeworski 2007) or at internal elites who constitute a coup threat (e.g., Boix and Svolik 2013).…”

How Modern Dictators Survive: Cooptation, Censorship, Propaganda, and Repression

“…By creating institutions that constrained him in the short run, a dictator could enable himself to commit credibly to certain policiesrepaying state debts and respecting property rights (North andWeingast 1989, Gehlbach andKeefer 2011), redistributing income to the poor (Boix 2003, Acemoglu andRobinson 2006), or sharing power with members of his ruling group (Myerson 2008, Svolik 2012, Boix and Svolik 2013. Models showed how such credible commitments could increase borrowing power and private investment in the first case, prevent revolutions in the second, and avoid coups or elite defection in the third.…”