The goal of explanation

Explanation, understanding, and control

“…Firstly, as (U-T) appeals to a specific notion of behavioral control, it appears consistent with the pragmatic proposal that understanding involves gaining an ability to do things (De Regt and Dieks 2005;De Regt 2009). Secondly, it is also at least partially consistent with the proposal that understanding is related to a specific type of knowledge (Grimm 2006(Grimm , 2010(Grimm , 2012Khalifa and Gadomski 2013;Khalifa 2012), insofar as knowledge is understood in the sense of knowing what one should do to achieve a given goal under different imaginable circumstances. True belief regarding the thing one understands is also seen as a necessary condition.…”

“…This may allow a response to Khalifa's deflationary (2012, p. 17) claim that understanding why simply amounts to "adequately representing the information demanded by one's preferred model of explanation". As reviewed in more detail above, on Khalifa's EMU account (2012), understanding why involves the possession of explanatory knowledge, and he argues that by equating understanding with such propositional knowledge (as provided by explanatory accounts such as Woodward's) EMU has the consequence of making recent theories of understanding (De Regt and Dieks 2005;De Regt 2009;Grimm 2010) redundant with theories of explanation. However, as (U-W) further requires rational intention formation abilities, and these abilities can be present or absent (or perhaps existent to different degrees) independently of one's possession of an appropriate mental representation, this suggests that (U-W) requires something further than just explanatory knowledge.…”

“…There has also been a recent, and somewhat separate debate among epistemologists, surrounding whether understanding should be in some sense subsumed within the field of epistemology, and itself be thought of as a specific type of knowledge (Grimm 2006(Grimm , 2010(Grimm , 2012Khalifa and Gadomski 2013;Khalifa 2012;Kvanvig 2007). Grimm (2012), for example, has recently defended the view that understanding is a knowledge of causes.…”

“…As long as I have an internal mental model that allows the right sorts of causal, logical, and other relevant inferences, I can rightfully claim to understand why according to Newman. Finally, Newman (2014) has attempted to respond to Khalifa's (2012) argument that many recent accounts of understanding why, such as that of Grimm (2010), De Regt (2009), and De Regt and Dieks (2005, can simply be reduced to ideas about explanation. Khalifa (2012p.…”

Understanding and explanation: Living apart together?

“…Understanding has become a hot topic in philosophy of science, as is shown by the fact that high-profile journals in the field regularly publish papers on it. Recent examples are Grimm (2010), Khalifa (2012a, 2012b), Newman (2012), de Regt (2009), and Wilkenfeld (2011. While these authors differ in their views about the exact characterization of understanding, its relation to explanation and the way to achieve it, they all agree that it is a legitimate philosophical topic in its own right.…”