The Influence of Corporate Front-Group Stealth Campaigns

Abstract

This research examined corporate front-group stealth campaigns. An experiment was conducted to examine the influence of front-group stealth campaigns on a variety of measures. It was anticipated that corporate front-group stealth campaigns, which feature names that mask the true interests of sponsors, positively affect public opinion, unless they are exposed as intentionally misleading, in which case they boomerang against sponsors. The experiment examined the potential of the inoculation strategy to preempt the influence of corporate front-group stealth campaigns. The pattern of results supported all of these expectations. Front-group stealth campaigns proved to be effective, at least in the short term. Front-group stealth campaigns eroded public attitudes toward the issue in question and boosted perceptions of the front group, but not the corporate sponsor. However, when front-group stealth campaigns were subsequently exposed, positive effects dissipated and perceptions of corporate sponsors boomeranged. Results revealed that inoculation can protect against the influence of front-group stealth campaigns.

A Meta-Analysis of Research on Inoculation Theory

“…Despite being small in magnitude, the consistency of the outcomes associated with inoculation has both theoretical and practical import. Pfau, Haigh, Sims, and Wigley (2007) argued that in ''the context of resistance research . .…”

Does It Matter Who’s Behind the Curtain? Anonymity in Political Advertising and the Effects of Campaign Finance Disclosure

“…The identity of financial contributors may not directly convey the preferences of the candidates that the independent group is supporting or opposing for office, but can provide that information indirectly, "depending on what the voters know (or believe they know) about the contributors-their judgment, values, and policy positions" (Mayer, 2010, p. 262). Disclosure may also help inoculate voters against potentially misleading claims by revealing that the sponsor represents an industry that the voter dislikes or by calling into question the sponsor's objectivity (Groenendyk & Valentino, 2002;Lupia & McCubbins, 1998;Pfau, Haigh, Sims, & Wigley, 2007). Similarly, voters may be more likely to discount claims from a group that is supported by a handful of wealthy individuals or narrow interests.…”

“…15 Despite the increased attention to "smart disclosure" (Garrison et al, 2012), there is little research examining the effects of campaign finance disclosure laws. A handful of recent studies have investigated the impact of group-sponsored advertising (Brooks & Murov, 2012;Johnson, Dunaway, & Weber, 2011;Pfau et al, 2007;Pfau, Park, Holbert, & Cho, 2001;Weber et al, 2012), but none address the effects of disclosure. Thus, despite the call for greater transparency in political advertising, we know little about whether voters are less likely to be persuaded by an ad when they know more about who is funding the attack (La Raja, 2007).…”

Astroturfing Global Warming: It Isn’t Always Greener on the Other Side of the Fence

“…However, little research has been conducted experimentally at the individual level; for example, on the extent to which astroturfing strategies are effective. We identified a study by Pfau et al (2007), which assessed the influence of corporate front-group stealth campaigns and examined the effects of post-hoc exposure of their deceptive practices. Using an experimental scenario of a front-group stealth campaign, they find that such campaigns succeed in influencing attitudes toward government restrictions on several business-related issues (e.g., federal legislation to control prescription prices under Medicare).…”