The Limits of Global Economic Governance after the 2007–09 International Financial Crisis

Abstract

The economic and financial crisis of 2007-09 uncovered serious deficiencies in the oversight of the global economy, some of which came to light quickly and induced a concerted response by national authorities and multilateral institutions. Foremost among them was the need for appropriate regulation of financial institutions and oversight of derivative financial instruments. In this area, the G20 led a response that is still underway. Meanwhile, new regional entities emerged to challenge the existing multilateral order built around the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO -a development that has prompted further attempts to reform the current framework, including the creation of new institutions. These responses, however, have left major gaps in global financial governance. We argue that these gaps include: the balkanisation of oversight over global capital flows and current account imbalances; inadequate international burden sharing and policy coordination in response to financial crises; and a persistent inability of global institutions and national governments to ensure that the gains and losses from financial globalisation are equitably distributed across and within countries. Looking forward, the G20 and relevant multilateral institutions need to broaden the agenda to ensure that economic growth can become more resilient to shocks, more generally shared across economies, and more inclusive within countries. Policy Recommendations• Establishing comprehensive systemic oversight: to preserve gains from globalisation, stronger cross-border regulatory cohesion and oversight of economic activity is essential, with a focus on a greater sharing of the costs of economic adjustment across as well as within countries.

Exploring the Nexus and Utilities Between Regional and Global Ocean Governance Architecture

“…It has gained traction, particularly with the unsettled yet continued power imbalances and diffused international financial order (Girvan, 2007;Drezner, 2012;Boughton et al, 2017), as well as the recalibrations of regional integration rooted within the broader framework of social-political change and trade liberalisation (Jones, 2001;Doidge, 2007;Jiboku and Okeke-Uzodike, 2016). The 2008 global economic crises exacerbated the former (Young et al, 2013;Boughton et al, 2017), while the latter predominantly emanates from the scope of developmental regionalism and the paradigm of market-led regional integration (Doidge, 2007;Draper, 2010;Jiboku and Okeke-Uzodike, 2016). Perhaps, one of the earliest official forms of regional ocean economic governance is the defunct EU Community Fisheries Agreements (CPAs) of 1976, which has now metamorphosised into the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) (Failler, 2015).…”

The BRICS Countries’ Bilateral Economic Relations, 2009 to 2019: Between Rhetoric and Reality

“…Against the backdrop of the economic and financial crisis of 2007 to 2009, the BRICS initiatives such as the NDB and CRA challenged the current multilateral order with a key role for the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO, in which these countries are underrepresented (see Boughton et al, 2017;Stuenkel, 2013Stuenkel, , 2015. The BRICS have in common that they all consider the post-World War II world order, with, for instance, a dominant role for the US and Europe in the Bretton Woods institutions, as unjust (see also Lukin, 2019b;Thakur, 2014).…”

Dimensions and Cartography of Dirty Money in Developing Countries: Tripping Up on the Global Hydra

“…The failure to curb IFFs is only one piece of evidence of the current crisis of multilateralism that became more marked after the 2007-2009 international financial crisis, as well as with the outbreak of the coronavirus. These problems suggest a need to break the gridlock in global governance that results from the increasing complexity of international relations and global power shifts (Boughton et al, 2017;Boulet et al, 2016;Hale et al, 2013).…”