The milgram experiment no one (in philosophy) is talking about.

Abstract

Philosophers such as Harman and Dorris use the Milgram experiments to show how tiny, seemingly inconsequential, situational variables have a surprising, but dramatic effect on behavior. In this article, I discuss variation 24 of the Milgram experiments, the relationship condition (RC). This variation, which involved family members or friends taking on both the roles of Teacher and Learner, has surprising results as, overwhelmingly, participants refused to obey authority. I argue that the experiments were wellorchestrated studies in obedience under pressure, but that, friends were able to resist even such a forceful influence to obey authority. I present an Aristotelian account of friendship as a character trait, discuss how character traits interact with situations, relate these theoretical accounts to the findings of the RC condition and conclude that friendship is a dispositional trait, one which ensures that friends behave in a predictable manner even under conditions of strain. This conclusion is predicted by philosophical accounts of friendship and supported by the empirical evidence of the RC condition-a variation of the Milgram experiment that is little discussed among psychologists and virtually unknown among philosophers. Public Significance StatementThis article discusses what conclusions we should draw from the relationship condition variation of the Milgram experiments and what implications these conclusions have for the philosophical understandings of character, virtue, and friendship. It formulates a response to the situationist challenge in philosophy, namely the idea that evidence from psychology shows that situational variables, rather than character traits, affect behavior.