The modularity of theory of mind

Segal, Gabriel

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511597985.010

Cited by 143 publications

(58 citation statements)

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“…55-56) and that instead, the brain's "connections are extraordinarily labile and dynamic" (p. 56). The unusual opposition of modular and dynamic illustrates the multiple ways in which the term modular is used (Coltheart, 1999;Segal, 1996). Modern conceptions of modularity are perfectly consistent with cognitive flexibility (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006;Sperber, 2005) 3.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 98%

Modularity and the Social Mind

Kurzban

Aktipis

2007

Pers Soc Psychol Rev

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A modular view of the mind implies that there is no unitary “self” and that the mind consists of a set of informationally encapsulated systems, many of which have functions associated with navigating an inherently ambiguous and competitive social world. It is proposed that there are a set of cognitive mechanisms—a social cognitive interface (SCI)—designed for strategic manipulation of others' representations of one's traits, abilities, and prospects. Although constrained by plausibility, these mechanisms are not necessarily designed to maximize accuracy or to maintain consistency with other encapsulated representational systems. The modular view provides a useful framework for talking about multiple phenomena previously discussed under the rubric of the self.

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 98%

Modularity and the Social Mind

Kurzban

Aktipis

2007

Pers Soc Psychol Rev

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“…It is the features of these specialized processes by which modularity is primarily defined. I briefly summarize the following eight features of modularity frequently discussed in the modularity literatures (Carruthers & Chamberlain, 2000;Coltheart, 1999;Fodor, 1983;Garfield, 1987;Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994;Marshall, 1984;Marslen-Wilson & Tyler, 1987;Segal, 1996).…”

Section: Features and Dimensions Of Modularitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If modularity is a property of these states and processes, then it is deep modularity. 16 There are, at least, three different types of deep modules depending on how we understand the basic structure of mind (Samuels et al, 1999;Segal, 1996). First, innate data structure (a body of information) can be included in the basic structure of mind.…”

Section: Deep Modules and Surface Modulesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Diversity and Unity of Modularity

Seok

2006

Cognitive Science

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Since the publication of Fodor's (1983) The Modularity of Mind, there have been quite a few discussions of cognitive modularity among cognitive scientists. Generally, in those discussions, modularity means a property of specialized cognitive processes or a domain-specific body of information. In actuality, scholars understand modularity in many different ways. Different characterizations of modularity and modules were proposed and discussed, but they created misunderstanding and confusion. In this article, I classified and analyzed different approaches to modularity and argued for the unity of modularity. Modularity is a multidimensional property consisting of features from several dimensions specifying different aspects of cognition. Among those, there are core features of modularity, and these core features form a cross-dimensional unity. Despite the diverse and liberal characterizations, modularity contributes to cognitive science because of the unity of the core features.

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“…Furthermore, ToM can suppose that during the training trials, the chimpanzees learned that each trainer wanted to be rewarded and believed that he would be if he chose the baited container. A ToM theorist can postulate, as some have (e.g., Segal 1996), that these mental-state attributions are plugged into a ToM module that is partly defined by intentional laws, such as: if one sees p, the (ceteris paribus) one knows p; and if one knows p, wants r, and believes that one will get r if one does q when p is the case, then (ceteris paribus) one will do q. From this, the chimpanzees will predict that the Knower will point to the baited container.…”

Section: Theory Of Mind and The "Somatic Marker Mechanism" (Smm)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Theory of mind and other domain-specific hypotheses

Heyes

2001

Behav Brain Sci

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Visuo-cognitive disambiguation of occluded shapes Rob van LierNijmegen Institute for Cognition and Information (NICI), University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands. r.vanlier@nici.kun.nl www.nici.kun.nl/People/LiervanRJ/index.html/ Abstract: Pessoa et al. (1998a) underexposed the broad and rich variety of stimuli in the amodal completion domain. The disambiguation of occluded shapes depends on very specific figural properties. Elaborations on such disambiguations of rich and complex stimuli, tied up with a visuocognitive origin of amodal completion, further position Pessoa et al.'s considerations on neural filling-in and the personal-subpersonal distinction. Pessoa et al. (1998a) have written an impressive paper on perceptual completion, comprising a wide scope of phenomena with diverse phenomenological qualities. Amodal completion certainly belongs to the weakest of the discussed completion phenomena. Every observer can witness that the phenomenological presence of amodal contour completions is not as compelling as, for example, blind spot filling-in, neon color spreading, or even the perception of illusory contours. Nevertheless, convincing psychophysical data exist on the relevance of amodal contour completions as well. Much of the research in the domain is concerned with the disambiguation of occluded shapes. That is, while in fact an infinitive number of different completions are possible for each and every visual pattern, only a few of them are plausible. Although Pessoa et al. briefly mentioned that local and global figural properties may influence completion, the richness of the domain, the diversity of completions, and the vision-versus-cognition dilemma (typical of this domain), are underexposed and not related to their own concepts (e.g., the personal-subpersonal distinction). This is a missed opportunity.Whereas in local approaches, completion depends on specific local configurations and proceeds by way of curved or linear interpolation between contour ends, in global approaches specific overall shape regularities (like bilateral symmetries) determine completion. 1 It is important to note here that local and global strategies may converge to the same shape but may also diverge to different shapes. The relevance of and competition between, both types of completions have been investigated by, for example, Sekuler (1994), Sekuler et al. (1994), and Van Lier et al. (1994;1995a; 1995b). 2 The stimulus-dependent plausibility of a small set of completions is not as self-evident as it might seem to be. For example, with his "ignorance-of-absence" assumption Dennett (1991) also disregards the specific influence of figural properties on completion by stating that the brain jumps to a conclusion (the issue here would be: what conclusion?).The unique status of a small set of completions also holds if the stimulus domain is further extended, for example, to a completion of the unseen back of a nonfamiliar object (Van Lier & Wagemens 1999) or so-called fuzzy completions of quasi-irregular shapes (Van Lier 1999). The m...

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The modularity of theory of mind

Cited by 143 publications

References 0 publications

Modularity and the Social Mind

Modularity and the Social Mind

Diversity and Unity of Modularity

Theory of mind and other domain-specific hypotheses

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